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The U.S. economy has undergone dramatic restructuring since the 1970s. These 
structural changes have had profound implications for every sector of U.S. society, but 
their effects on the development of U.S. healthcare policy have not yet received adequate 
theoretical or empirical attention. My dissertation addresses this gap with a specific focus 
on the development of neoliberal capitalism. Using Social Structure of Accumulation 
(SSA) theory, I analyze three important cases of U.S. healthcare legislation: the 
establishment of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in 1965, the failed Clinton Health 
Security Act of 1994, and the recent Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
of 2010. 
I argue that these reforms must be understood in relation to its contemporary 
SSA—the set of dominant institutions and ideas that facilitates capitalist accumulation. I 
show how in each period, the structures of the proposed policies, as well as their support, 
opposition, and ultimate legislative outcomes, all reflect the concurrent restructuring of 
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U.S. capitalism. Chapter 1 offers an overview of the unique developments in U.S. 
healthcare. Chapter 2 categorizes and evaluates the existing literature on U.S. healthcare 
development and outlines the contributions of this dissertation. Chapter 3 presents a 
theoretical overview of social structure of accumulation theory and the concept of 
neoliberal capitalism. Chapter 4 analyzes the 1965 Amendments to the Social Security 
Act, which established the programs of Medicare and Medicaid and passed at the height 
of regulated capitalism. Chapter 5 analyzes the attempted Clinton healthcare reforms that 
occurred in the 1990s, when neoliberal capitalism was well entrenched. Chapter 6 
analyzes the passage of the ACA, which was precipitated by the 2008 financial crisis, 
when neoliberal capitalism’s institutions and dominant ideology were under threat. I 
analyze the ways in which this crisis facilitated the passage of the ACA, a healthcare 
reform with features significantly more statist than those that were blocked in the 1990s. 
This analysis of the interplay of neoliberal capitalism and the U.S. healthcare sector fills a 
gap in the existing literature on when and how the U.S. healthcare system is able to resist 
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Healthcare in the United States is expensive, wasteful, and inaccessible. The 
average amount of healthcare spending per person in the U.S. is twice that of the average 
high-income country. This spending accounts for nearly 18 percent of the nation's GDP, 
double the share devoted in comparable countries. Despite the tremendous resources 
dedicated to healthcare, the system yields worse health outcomes relative to those of peer 
nations. (Sawyer and Cox 2018) Americans face the worst burden of disease, the lowest 
life expectancy, and the highest maternal mortality rates among rich countries (Tikkanen 
and Abrams 2020). The recent global pandemic of COVID-19 has magnified the depths 
of the system’s failings and pervasive stratification. With only five percent of the world’s 
population, the U.S. accounts for nearly twenty five percent of the pandemic’s fatalities. 
Black Americans, over a quarter of those fatalities, are more than three times likely to die 
from coronavirus compared to white Americans. (American Public Media 2020) 
The problems and disparities of the U.S. healthcare system are not modern 
developments. The healthcare system’s undesirable distinctions were established early. 
Many countries, including Canada, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Italy, Australia, and the 
United Kingdom, established universal coverage prior to 1980. With neither a national 
health insurance program nor a national health service, the healthcare system in the U.S 
has long been an outlier. The U.S. has spent the largest share of its GDP on healthcare 
spending since 1980, while maintaining the lowest or second lowest probability of 
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surviving to age fifty among 17 rich countries (National Research Council & Institute of 
Medicine, 2013).  
In light of the system’s persistent shortcomings, legislation creating universal 
health coverage for the nation has been a bedrock of political debate. Despite early 
indicators of the system’s failure, the United States has only become more resolute in 
developing its divergent healthcare system. In its absence, the peculiar structure of the 
U.S. healthcare system has continued to expand and evolve. This dissertation analyzes 
the structural conditions that contribute to the major developments in U.S. healthcare. 
Below, I briefly discuss some of the major features of the development in the U.S. 
healthcare system before broadly outlining my analysis. 
Features of U.S. healthcare 
One key feature of U.S. healthcare is the increasing individual responsibility for 
payment for healthcare services and products, to the detriment of broad-based access and 
positive health outcomes. Insurance plans featuring co-pays and deductibles are more 
common while these deductibles and co-pays themselves have increased over time as 
well. Even with employer-sponsored coverage, once considered the gold standard of 
private health insurance, insured workers now face growing financial instability in the 
event of a serious health problem (Rae, Panchal, and Claston 2012). The increased use of 
cost-shifting in healthcare leaves Americans financially vulnerable, especially as medical 
inflation rates have outpaced overall inflation.  
Because of the increased financial responsibility associated with accessing 
healthcare, many insured Americans forgo necessary care and medications (Families 
USA 2015). The 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA), has limited the out-of-pocket 
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payments for which individuals are responsible. However, medical bills remain the 
leading cause of bankruptcies in the United States (Khazan 2014). 
The number of for-profit hospitals and other healthcare centers has increased 
dramatically. This change has occurred alongside an expansion in the number of for-
profit insurers, who themselves are playing a larger role in healthcare. Many insurance 
companies restrict their enrollee’s choice of healthcare provider by establishing networks 
of physicians and only covering services that are “in network.” Physicians in the insurer’s 
network may also face additional restrictions: specific courses of treatment recommended 
by the physician may be questioned or even overruled by insurance adjusters. 
Over the last half century, the composition of the medical workforce and the 
nature of the work itself has also changed significantly. The role of non-physicians has 
increased. Workers such as certified nursing assistants, physician assistants, and 
registered nurses take on expanded roles in healthcare visits. Patient care has become 
increasingly regimented. Research has shown that doctors in emergency rooms spend 
more time with electronic medical records than with patients (Hill, Sears, and Melanson 
2013). The pressure to increase patient turnover has also substantially changed. 
Physicians now see more patients, and on average spend less time with each (Chen 2013). 
As a result, patients on a whole feel that the quality of their care has deteriorated. 
Simultaneously, physicians are more likely to be dissatisfied with their work than 
workers in a variety of other fields (Wible 2014).  
Understanding the Regressive Development 
Given the retrograde features of US healthcare, reform is a near constant topic of 
debate in U.S. politics. Reformers have met mixed success. Some periods, such the 
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Johnson (1965) and Obama (2010) administrations have been marked by the successes of 
significant healthcare reforms. In others, such as the Clinton administration of the 1990s, 
the U.S. healthcare system has blocked significant change. 
 How can we understand the distinctive features of the U.S. healthcare system? 
Why and how does the U.S. healthcare system yield to change? What factors influence 
the success or failure of healthcare reform? I argue that an analysis of the changing 
structures of capitalism yields critically important and new insights into these questions.  
The U.S. healthcare system is deeply embedded in and reflects the existing 
economic relations. Thus, a full understanding of U.S. healthcare reforms must consider 
contemporary economic structure. Capitalism, the present dominant form of economic 
relations in the United States, is a dynamic system. The particular characteristics of 
capitalist economic systems evolve over time. However, the literature has not yet 
connected changes in healthcare policy and development to the structural changes that 
have occurred in the U.S. economy. In this study, I contribute to the existing literature 
with an analysis of how the developments in the U.S. healthcare system reflect the 
contemporaneous changes in capitalism.  
 In this dissertation, I consider three important legislative cases: Medicare and 
Medicaid in 1965, the Clinton Health Security Act in 1994, and the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010. These three health reforms are recognized as 
landmark events in the development of healthcare in the United States. Other incremental 
changes in healthcare legislation have taken place over the last 60 years, but these 
provide particularly appropriate case studies. Each characterized an era in U.S. 
healthcare, not only in the substantive changes they brought about in the provision of 
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health services but in their place in the public discourse and as objects of political debate. 
Each became a part of the larger culture of the times and a defining part of the 
administrations’ legacies.  
The timing of these three reforms presents an opportunity to compare the details 
of healthcare reform across changing capitalist structures. Each reflected the social 
structure of accumulation (SSA)—the era of capitalist development and institutional 
structure—in which it developed. Medicare and Medicaid were passed at the height of the 
era of regulated capitalism following World War II. The attempted healthcare reform in 
the early 1990s happened when neoliberal capitalism was well developed. The ACA 
emerged when neoliberal capitalism was under challenge following the economic crisis 
of 2008.  
The case studies use a historical institutional approach to analyze how healthcare 
reforms are developed, passed, and enforced in different political, social, and economic 
contexts. Each case study explores how the structure of the proposed healthcare programs 
reflects the boundaries and influence of the existing stage of the social structure of 
accumulation of the time, and how the reforms reflect the healthcare system’s adaptations 
to new institutional forms of capitalism. I identify the groups who supported and opposed 
the reform, their arguments, and evaluate why in each environment certain types of 
arguments were or were not effective. In each case study, I argue that the particular 
dynamics of capitalism are a predominant factor in explaining when and how U.S. 
healthcare policy has developed.  
 The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In the second chapter, I 
categorize and evaluate the existing literature on the development of the U.S. healthcare 
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sector. In the third chapter, I present the motivating framework for understanding the 
development of U.S. capitalism. The next three chapters apply this framework to analyze 
three major healthcare reform efforts. Chapter 4 analyzes the establishment of the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs in 1965. Chapter 5 analyzes the failed reforms of the 
Clinton administration in 1994. Chapter 6 analyzes the most recent major healthcare 
reform, the ACA of 2010. A final chapter recapitulates the major conclusions of the case 









The characteristics and shortcomings of the U.S. healthcare system described in 
the previous chapter beg the question of why and how the U.S. healthcare system exists 
and persists. A vast literature featuring critical studies of the U.S. healthcare system and 
welfare state yields insights into this puzzle. This chapter briefly describes key themes 
from that literature. I then review limitations of the existing studies before outlining this 
dissertation’s contribution to the debate.  
Contributions of the existing literature  
The literature describing the U.S. welfare state and healthcare system draws from 
a variety of disciplines. Economists, historians, sociologists, and political scientists all 
contribute, often using distinct frameworks that defy simple categorization. Nonetheless, 
an imperfect and simplistic categorization of the literature provides a useful entry point to 
understanding the debate over the development of the U.S. healthcare system. The 
literature may be broadly described as largely featuring a combination of three 
overlapping genres of social explanation: (1) cultural characteristics, (2) intergroup 
conflict, and (3) institutions.  
Cultural Characteristics 
Many authors identify the relatively weak welfare state in the United States as the 
consequence of a set of distinctly American values. In a comparative study of the 
divergence between health insurance in Canada and in the United States, Boychuk (2008) 
highlights the ways in which racial politics were the key element in shaping attempts at 
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healthcare reform under Truman and Clinton, and in the development and 
implementation of Medicare and Medicaid. He argues the Canada’s success in legislating 
universal health insurance was a result of the politics of territorial and linguistic 
integration in Canada.  
Gordon's (2004) analysis emphasizes the limits of the New Deal legislation, 
which established a framework for the further development of the U.S. welfare state. 
Participation in the New Deal’s social programs was restricted. Occupations with many 
Black workers, such as agricultural and domestic jobs, were excluded from benefits. 
Gordon also explores the ways that southern segregationists threatened and limited the 
creation and implementation of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. The expansion of 
employment-based health insurance repeated and magnified these dynamics. Positions 
that offered health insurance benefits remained often inaccessible for Black workers. 
Racial disparities have also been reinforced and magnified by enduring residential 
segregation, which limits access to the sites of healthcare—hospitals or public clinics.  
Enduring racism has also shaped public perception of a selection of visible 
government programs. This coupling of race and government subsidy and spending is 
cited as helping to stave off national health reform in both the Clinton and Obama 
administrations (Gaffney et al. 2018; J. A. Morone 1995; Mulligan 2018). Recent 
dynamics of the ACA's retrenchment and the attempts at further retrenchment during the 
Trump era have also been analyzed using the lens of race and white nationalism (J. A. 
Morone and Blumenthal 2018). 
Inequalities in family structures and gender inequalities have similarly been 
identified as an influence in the U.S. healthcare system's development. Due to the 
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employment-based health insurance system, women’s health insurance coverage was 
often only accessed through their male partner. Expansions of the welfare state have also 
been connected to traditionally feminine concepts and thus expanding health insurance 
has also become synonymous with emasculation. (Folbre 2009; C. Gordon 2004; 
Mulligan and Castañeda 2018) 
Lipsett (1996) takes a slightly different approach to describing the development of 
American health care. He argues that America’s peculiar financing of healthcare and the 
underdevelopment of a health welfare state are the results of an “American 
exceptionalism.” He notes that since the American Revolution, American culture has 
upheld the values of personal responsibility, freedom, and skepticism of government. He 
argues that these values have continually influenced Americans’ unwillingness to 
subsidize others’ healthcare. Thus, the lack of a welfare state reflects the so-called 
“American values” which have been a consistent part of U.S. culture since the colonies’ 
revolution. Ideological rigidity is also highlighted in Morone (1990) and Fox (1986).  
The belief that the desires of the American people are reflected in the 
development of medical institutions is also central to Starr’s (1982) analysis in The Social 
Transformation of American Medicine, one of the most cited accounts of the history of 
the medical field. Starr attributes the failure of national health insurance before the First 
World War to Americans’ lack of desire for national health insurance. The passage of 
Medicare and Medicaid, Starr argues, was Congress’s response to the increased growing 
demands for access to healthcare of the 1960s (1982, 368). Future reforms were not able 
to expand coverage for additional groups because by the 1970s Americans’ opinions had 
changed. The Reagan administration’s proposed policy changes, consolidating federal 
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health programs in block grants to states and capping federal support for Medicare, each 
reflected this change in public opinion.  
Starr presciently forewarns that this reprivatization will “accelerate the movement 
toward an entirely new system of corporate medical enterprise” (1982, 419). However, 
Starr asserts that the future developments of the healthcare sector and the possibility of 
the medical system transforming into a new system under corporate control ultimately 
“depends on choices that Americans have still to make” (1982, 449). Again, Starr leaves 
the final determinant for the direction of healthcare reform to decisions of the electorate. 
Intergroup Conflict 
A related genre of explanation for the development of healthcare policy in the 
United States focuses on the role of group conflict. The unique system of healthcare 
financing and provision in the United States is credited as the outcome of struggles 
between groups with competing objectives and varying levels of influence. The divisions 
of the relevant groups and how each group’s influence is determined varies across 
researchers. 
Often, the battle over national healthcare or national health insurance is depicted 
as a series of battles between various stakeholders within the healthcare industry (e.g. 
employers, physicians, hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, and health insurance 
companies). Quadagno (2006) argues that competing groups of healthcare stakeholders 
have had various levels of success in mobilizing important political allies. During each 
period of reform, the group that most successfully mobilized their allies is able to exert 
influence on healthcare policy. In each case, the successful group blocks any proposal 
perceived as harmful and ensures that any successful reform would be to their benefit.  
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Different groups’ varying degrees of success in spearheading opposition to 
national health reform over time is central to Quadagno’s argument. Quadagno labels the 
initial failures of national health insurance the result of successful organizing by 
physicians. However, rising medical costs in the 1970s and 1980s reduced physicians’ 
public influence. In the employment-based health insurance system, as rising medical 
costs increasingly fell on employers, they were motivated to organize and challenge the 
power of physicians. Through business groups such as the Business Roundtable or 
Chamber of Commerce, employers enshrined their preferred healthcare reform policies. 
Private health insurance companies were similarly strengthened by the declining power 
of physicians and thus were subsequently able to successfully shape healthcare legislation 
in the 1990s to their interests. 
Other accounts of the U.S. healthcare system organize the competing groups 
differently. Navarro (1993) argues that the defining characteristic motivating the group 
struggle over healthcare is class. He suggests that a struggle between the working class 
and the capitalist class has shaped the provision of healthcare and its financing in 
developed countries. Each class has competing goals for healthcare policy. The strength 
of each class to exert its demands determines its ability to influence public policy. 
Navarro identifies several factors that determine the strength of the working class, 
including its degree of unionization and linkage to a political party. Thus, the low 
unionization and weakness of the working classes, as well as the lack of a mass-based 
socialist political party, have resulted in the lack of a comprehensive national health 
insurance program.  
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Instead of viewing the healthcare system as a struggle between two classes with 
opposing goals, Swenson (2015) theorizes that it is agreement, not opposition, between 
labor and capital that shapes healthcare provision. He argues that social reforms only 
succeed when both the interests of business and labor have aligned such that they each 
benefit from progressive policy changes. The ultimate agency for these reforms is 
credited to elected officials, who undertake these reforms as “opportunities to get votes, 
serve objective business interests and [create] acts of social betterment” (p. 34). Thus, he 
credits the creation of Medicare and Medicaid and the success of the Affordable Care Act 
to the business community’s interests in reform.  
In their seminal work Regulating the Poor, Piven and Cloward (1993) create an 
alternative framework for understanding the development of the U.S. welfare state in the 
context of capitalism and class conflict. They argue that the development of the U.S. 
welfare state is a means for the reproduction of the existing social order. Piven and 
Cloward connect public relief expansions after the Great Depression or during the Civil 
Rights Era, such as Medicare and Medicaid, as tools to mute civil disorder. Contractions 
in relief arrangements serve to reinforce work norms and regulate marginal labor to 
maintain capitalist hegemony.  
Another variation of the group conflict literature highlights the importance of the 
medical-industrial complex (Burlage, Anderson, and Waitzkin 2018; Chernomas and 
Hudson 2013; Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1971; Estes, Harrington, and Pellow 2001; 
Himmelstein and Woolhandler 1990; Relman 1980; Waitzkin and Working Group for 
Health Beyond Capitalism 2018; Wohl 1984). The precise definition of the medical-
industrial complex varies across researchers and through time. A common feature of 
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these analyses is the linkages and shared interests of a growing variety of healthcare 
corporations, such as medical device makers, hospital chains, nursing homes, private 
insurance companies, and pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the deepening integration 
of the not-for-profit, for-profit, and public systems. Studies that focus on the role of the 
medical-industrial complex analyze the various ways in which the growing political and 
economic power of these industrial actors shape the public discussion of healthcare and 
the perceived possibilities for change, such as through political donations and the 
“revolving door” between industry and state positions. This research is an important 
addition to the intergroup conflict analysis of healthcare development and places the 
intra- and inter-group battles within the complex site of capitalist economic relations.  
Institutions 
Other researchers emphasize the importance of state structures in thwarting 
attempts to establish national health insurance in the United States. Steinmo and Watts 
(1995) argue that U.S. political institutions are structurally biased against comprehensive 
reform. They credit the failure of every attempt at national health insurance from Franklin 
D. Roosevelt to Bill Clinton as the result of these institutions. The level of consensus 
required by the American federal system of checks and balances is so arduous that “if this 
level of public consensus around particular reform proposals had been necessary in other 
democracies, no country would have ever developed an national health insurance system” 
(p. 339).  
Amenta (1998) applies a similar explanation in his study describing the politics 
and origins of American public spending, which he notes is an outlier in many areas 
including healthcare. Amenta argues that features of the government in the United States 
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set the path for the current gaps in American social policy. He argues that the political 
institutions in the United States have “dispersed the power of pro-spending actors and 
placed greater obstacles in front of them than advocates of similar policies elsewhere” (p. 
15).  
In a similar comparison of the American and Canadian welfare systems, Maioni 
(1998) emphasizes the role of the political institutions in shaping political parties. Maioni 
explains the success of Canadian health care reform as due to institutions that permitted 
and fostered the development of a social-democratic third party capable of successfully 
lobbying for national health insurance. In the United States, there are several serious 
impediments to the formation of third parties. Without a unified political voice for the 
left, health reformers were forced to work with limited strategies focused on building a 
coalition within the Democratic Party and were ultimately unsuccessful. 
Each of the analyses above identify how a specific feature or institution of the 
U.S. government limited the expansion of healthcare reform in the United States. Other 
variations of institutionalist literature highlight the dynamic and historically contingent 
nature of these institutions. Hacker (1998) is one such example of this genre of 
explanation. While emphasizing the importance of institutions in creating the prospects 
for change, Hacker also notes the important feedback effects that political decisions have 
on subsequent political structures. Thus, it is not just the political institutions themselves 
that are critical to developing a healthcare system, but also how those institutions shape 
future public views, interest-group strategies, market conditions, and the political and 
economic environment. Rather than solely focusing on institutions, Hacker adds the 
sequencing of policy changes as an important component in shaping healthcare reform. 
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Comparing the medical policies in the United States, Great Britain, and Canada, 
Hacker argues that the United States could not successfully implement a universal system 
because of critical sequencing problems that cemented the path to the American health 
system. Hacker argues that a national health insurance plan cannot be enacted if a 
significant portion of the population is already insured in private plans. By initially 
offering public insurance programs only to residual populations, like the very poor or 
elderly, and by building up the medical industry before providing universal access, 
Hacker argues, American reformers created additional insurmountable obstacles to 
national health insurance. Instead of paving the way for expanded universal care, 
Medicare and Medicaid instead created large groups of insured Americans who became 
fiercely protective of the programs and obstacles to its expansion. 
Skocpol’s (1997) research on the Clinton administration’s healthcare reform in 
her book Boomerang also analyzes the dynamics of policy feedback. She explores how 
the effects of the large federal deficits generated from policies of the Reagan 
administration shaped the design of Clinton’s healthcare reform proposal and helped 
facilitate its failure. Ultimately Skocpol argues that this fueled a profound anti-
government backlash making future healthcare reforms difficult. 
The relevant literature on the development of healthcare reform does not solely 
focus on major episodes of legislative successes or failures. Institutionalist literature on 
the development of U.S. healthcare also provides an account of how smaller or more 
incremental health policies are adopted. Pierson (1995) expanded the literature on the 
development of welfare state programs by arguing that they were not only resistant to 
expansion, but also resistant to retrenchment. Hacker (2004) clarified the ways in which a 
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“hidden retrenchment” in social policy occurs. Although important welfare programs 
such as Social Security and Medicare have never been successfully fully privatized, 
Hacker analyzes the ways Americans nonetheless became increasingly exposed to risk. 
 Later analyses, which centered the concepts of legislative drift, layering, and 
conversion, further clarified the mechanisms through which policy feedback occurs 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005). Legislative drift occurs when laws and policies are not 
formally altered but are changed through the shifts in the policy environment. Layering 
refers to institutional changes that result from gradual additions of new elements to 
existing institutions. Conversion refers to how a given policy may be used to achieve 
alternative outcomes depending on who is administering the law. (Hacker, Thelen, and 
Pierson 2013) 
These perspectives on policy feedback effects have become an important part of 
the literature on health policy changes in the early twenty-first century. Researchers have 
identified some specific conditions that are conducive to certain types of these legislative 
adjustments. Hacker (2004) specifies that policies are likely to experience drift when 
there are high barriers to change and a high bias towards the status-quo. Policies develop 
through layering when barriers are high but there is less of a bias towards the status-quo. 
Conversion occurs when the barriers to change are low but the environment is biased 
towards the status-quo (p. 48). Hacker uses the changes in employer-provided health 
insurance in the 1990s and early 2000s as an example of a policy conversion. Hacker’s 
(2010) description of “Why Reform Happened” in the Obama administration credits the 
success of the Affordable Care Act as a result of a lowered bias towards the status-quo 
thanks in part to worsening economic conditions and rising healthcare costs. Tuohy 
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(2018) analyzes the Affordable Care Act as an example of a policy change through 
layering. She provides an alternative schema for understanding when policy changes 
happen at a fast pace but are smaller in scale. This framework has also been recently 
deployed in understanding the ongoing changes in implementation of the law (Béland, 
Rocco, and Waddan 2016; Burgin 2018). 
The institutional analyses noted above specify how specific state structures affect 
healthcare reform and the importance of the feedback effects of pre-existing welfare 
policies. Other researchers have emphasized the role of specific legal institutions distinct 
from welfare policy that have influenced the development of the healthcare sector. 
Havirghurst (2001) describes how the 1975 Supreme Court decision of Goldfarb vs 
Virginia State Legislature, which brought an end to the decades-long exemption that 
allowed doctors to operate outside of the confines of anti-trust legislation, played a 
critical role in the development of American medicine. Havirghurst argues that after 
doctors were actively prohibited from collective action or collusion using the logic of 
market competition to organize the healthcare industry became viable.  
 Like Havirghurst, Ameringer (2008) also emphasizes the role of legal institutions, 
alongside group conflict, in shaping the development of American healthcare. He 
emphasizes the role of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and its use of anti-trust laws 
to explain the development of American healthcare since the 1970s. He frames the FTC’s 
actions as a change from the public-interest theory of regulation to the Chicago school 
economic theory of regulation. The application of the economic theory of regulation to 
antitrust regulation spurred the healthcare system’s development into a system dominated 
by market forces. Once the ideology of market forces was entrenched, Ameringer argues 
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that interest groups, such as organized medicine, began their struggle for control and 
influence over legislation. 
Ameringer uses the example of changes in healthcare development to theorize 
more broadly why policy regimes arise and the processes through which they are 
changed. His argument is that both powerful ideas and private interests are central to 
understanding changes. Ideas became more central to change than private interests when 
the changes were non-incremental, and private interests are more important in change 
once a new regime has emerged. Thus, he argues that the economic theory of regulation 
and markets prompted the major changes in healthcare structure. Once a new healthcare 
regime was in place and market theory became a dominant ideology, special interests 
used this ideology to their advantage.  
 Gottschalk’s (2000) account of the development of American healthcare also 
highlights the dialectical relationship between institutions and interest groups and the 
importance of institutional environment in shaping interest-group behavior. Gottschalk 
identifies three other institutions that were critical in shaping interest group strategy and 
in cementing the place of private health insurance in a private healthcare system in the 
United States: the Taft-Hartley plans under the Labor and Management Relations Act, the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and the acceptance of experience-rated 
health insurance.  
Once these institutions were in place, Gottschalk argues, business and labor’s 
alliance was solidified. Instead of the concerns for social justice that motivated the fights 
for health care in the 1940s and early 1970s, the themes of business productivity and 
international competition dominated health reform discourse in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
19 
Gottschalk argues that this choice of strategy, conditioned by legislation such as the Taft-
Hartley Act, set the course for the exclusion of the health care in the American welfare 
state. 
Limitations of the existing literature 
The existing literature provides a thorough description of the problems in the U.S. 
healthcare system and a history of its development. It includes persuasive analyses of the 
ways in which cultural characteristics, group conflict, and certain institutions have 
impacted the U.S. healthcare system. Further analyses have clarified and theorized the 
mechanisms of institutional changes and policy feedback effects.  
However, the existing literature is so far incomplete. An enduring set of cultural 
characteristics does not adequately explain why the healthcare system has developed as it 
has. Pervasive racism and a mistrust in government, while certainly features of U.S. 
political debate, could manifest in various configurations of healthcare systems. Also, 
these explanations are insufficient given the variety of social programs in the United 
States and the tremendous amount of federal spending on American healthcare. Analyses 
like Starr’s, which do not rely on stable characteristics, must explain why attitudes 
towards reform change in each period.  
Similarly, if changes in the healthcare system are attributed to various groups’ 
power waxing and waning over time, some explanatory framework for these shifts in 
power is required. What determines the relative strength and position of groups and 
stakeholders and the various strategies used by each?  Existing accounts of class struggle 
in healthcare reforms neglect an analysis of how and why labor and capital may come to 
an agreement, as in the case of Swenson (2015; 2018). Navarro (1993) does not explain 
 
20 
why, in each period, a class is able to become dominant and successfully exert their 
demands in policy. Analyses of the medical industrial complex, which also analyze the 
profit motive in healthcare as it relates to class struggle, have not yet adequately 
explained the changing features within the medical industrial complex. Nor do they offer 
a coherent account of why the medical industrial complex supports or opposes specific 
reforms in different time periods.  
Finally, analyses that focus on the political institutional features of the United 
States do not fully account for what made these political institutions amenable to the 
reforms of the Obama and Johnson administrations but not those of the Clinton 
administration. Analysis of legislative drift, layering, and conversion are similarly 
incomplete without an understanding of what determines the difficulty of barriers to 
change and shapes the bias towards the status-quo. Questions of what prompted the legal 
changes in the regulatory structure of the Federal Trade Commission and why these 
changes were not made earlier also remain unanswered. 
Contributions of this dissertation 
I suggest that social structures of accumulation (SSA) theory, which analyzes the 
conditions of capitalist development and the dynamics of its contradictions, adds an 
important and separate explanation of the development of the U.S. healthcare system. 
The U.S. healthcare system is deeply embedded in and reflects the existing economic 
relations. A full understanding of U.S. healthcare reforms must consider contemporary 
economic structure. However, the literature has not yet connected the developments in 
healthcare to the major structural changes in the U.S. economy over the last fifty years. 
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In this study, I contribute to the existing literature with an analysis of how recent 
developments in the U.S. healthcare system reflect the contemporaneous changes in the 
characteristics of capitalism. SSA theory yields insights into how and why changes in 
institutions, ideas, and the relative power of groups discussed above come about. Most 
importantly for our purposes, SSA theory also offers an account of why and how these 
changes produced different outcomes for healthcare reform in different times.  
A thorough presentation of a framework for understanding the changing ideas, 
institutions, and class relations of U.S. capitalism using SSA theory is discussed in the 
next chapter. Following that, I undertake three case studies to further explore the 
mechanisms through which changes in the structure of capitalism have shaped and 
limited reforms in the U.S. healthcare system. Specifically, these case studies explore the 
ways in which the United States’ cultural characteristics and political institutions have 
been shaped by the SSA, as well as how competing interest groups have been compelled 
to operate within the existing stage of an SSA.  
This analysis complements and fills a gap within the existing literature. 
Examining the complex interdependence of capitalism and the U.S. healthcare system 
will help elucidate the limited alternatives under which administrators and policy 






SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF ACCUMULATION THEORY AND THE CONCEPT 
OF NEOLIBERAL CAPITALISM 
 
Introduction 
Previous chapters introduced the claim that the development in healthcare in the 
United States reflects the concurrent developments in capitalism. This chapter offers a 
brief overview of the framework through which I will analyze this claim. The goal of this 
chapter is to provide an overview of social structure of accumulation theory and define 
the concept of neoliberal capitalism. I then offer a general summary of the relationship 
between the healthcare sector and capitalist development.  
Origins of SSA Theory 
Social structure of accumulation theory was developed by political economists in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. The analysis provides a framework for understanding two 
distinct characteristics of capitalism’s dynamics. First, why does capitalism experience 
alternating periods of stability and crises? Secondly, why capitalism has had distinct 
characteristics over time? Gordon, Reich, and Edwards (1982) presents the first 
systematic definition of social structures of accumulation. Their work explores the 
relationship between the dynamics of capitalism and changes in the labor process and 
labor markets. Social structure of accumulation theory has since been further developed 
and clarified in the works of Bowles et al. (1990), Kotz and McDonough (1994), and 
McDonough et al. (2010). I draw from this series of books to present the main 




Capitalism is an economic system characterized by the production of workers 
hired in exchange for a wage by a smaller population of employers. These employers, or 
capitalists, take ownership of the final products of the workers. If a capitalist is 
successful, the final product is then sold for a higher price than that of the workers’ labor 
and input costs. If the revenue gained from the sale is greater than the cost of producing 
the good, then the successful capitalist is also entitled to distribute the surplus generated 
from that sale. 
 These basic mechanics of the wage-labor relation have persisted throughout all 
periods of capitalist accumulation. However, the history of capitalism is far from 
unchanging. This wage-labor relationship has existed in many different forms. The 
relationship between workers and their employers, the nature of the labor process, and the 
role of the government in the economy, have all varied throughout history.  
SSA theory analyzes the various distinct forms of capitalism that have arisen as 
comprising of a cohesive set of long-standing practices or behavioral patterns. According 
to SSA theory, a rich set of institutions emerges in each period to support the process of 
capitalist profit-making. These institutions are economic, political, and cultural in nature. 
Along with the dominant ideas in each period, these institutions are required to ensure the 
existence and reproduction of the capitalist economic system.  
As detailed by Marxian and Keynesian economic theories, the successful 
generation of profits through the wage-labor process are never fully guaranteed. Conflicts 
may emerge between the capitalists and the workers, there may be insufficient demand 
for the final products, and the return of capitalists’ investments are fundamentally 
 
24 
unpredictable. According to SSA theory, these problems of capitalism are temporarily 
mitigated by the emergence of a coherent set of mutually enforcing institutions and 
dominant ideas. This set of institutions and ideas, referred to as the social structure of 
accumulation, regulate key processes and relationships in the capitalist economy. Jointly, 
these aspects of the SSA helps promote a positive rate of profit, maintains total demand 
growth, and creates stability and predictability for the investment decisions. 
However, the success of an SSA is limited. The history of capitalism is 
punctuated with economic crisis and recession. SSA theory understands these 
occurrences as distinct phases within an SSA. Each SSA is marked by a period of 
consolidation and a period of decay. In the initial consolidation period of an SSA, the 
joint set of economic, political, and cultural institutions and dominant ideas effectively 
promotes stability and profit-making. The institutions are mutually reinforcing. Over time 
they become further entrenched in the society. Eventually, the institutions will stop 
working effectively and the SSA enters a period of decay. The problems of capitalist 
accumulation reemerge, and the economy enters a period of long-run economic crisis. 
Only the construction of a new SSA and its new corresponding set of institutions can 
resolve such a crisis and accommodate continued capitalist accumulation. 
Because an economic crisis can only be solved through the emergence of a new 
set of institutions that permit continued accumulation, the crisis prompts a prolonged 
conflict in society over how to best restore the conditions of profitability. The crisis will 
destabilize a variety of institutions, and as various groups take advantage of that 
destabilization to pursue their own interests, each becomes an area of competition. 
Ultimately the successful restoration of capitalist accumulation requires a new cohesive 
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set of institutions, which will include political, cultural, ideological, and economic 
institutions. 
Post-war capitalism in the U.S. 
It should be noted that SSA theory does not provide a framework for dating the 
arrival or decay of an SSA. Nonetheless, within the literature it is widely accepted that 
since World War II, there have been two distinct SSAs in the United States: regulated 
capitalism and neoliberal capitalism, both of which proved stable for decades. Below, I 
briefly review the major characteristics of each period of capitalism identified in the SSA 
literature. 
Regulated Capitalism 
Regulated capitalism emerged in the 1940s. Bowles et. al (1990, chap. 5) provide 
an account of the emergence and the decay of this initial institutional structure of postwar 
capitalism. They argue that capitalism in this period was marked by a limited capital-
labor accord, a capitalist-citizen accord, the containment of intercapitalist rivalry and a 
particular relationship between U.S. capital and actors outside the country. These 
institutions secured the conditions for capitalist accumulation for decades and led to high 
rates of profit and rapid growth of hourly income. Chapter 4 discusses how the 
characteristics of regulated capitalism shaped the creation of Medicare and Medicaid. 
Each of the institutions that emerged in the 1940s eventually became an obstacle 
to continued economic growth and accumulation. Bowles et al. describe the mechanisms 
through which conflicts arose within each of these institutions and destabilized the 
postwar SSA. The conflicts ultimately lead to the slow productivity growth, accelerating 
inflation and unemployment, and international monetary instability of the 1970s. The 
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stagflation and instability of the 1970s are interpreted as a structural crisis of the 
regulated capitalist SSA. 
Neoliberal Capitalism 
 Kotz (2015, chaps. 2, 3) argues that during the late 1970s and early 1980s, a new 
form of capitalism, neoliberal capitalism, emerged to successfully restore capitalist 
accumulation. This new SSA was marked by a distinct set of institutions. Kotz identifies 
five dimensions through which neoliberal capitalism differed from its preceding SSA: the 
corporate sector, the capital-labor relation, the role of government in the economy, the 
global economy, and in the dominant economic ideology. In all five aspects of the 
economy, market forces and market relations played a stronger role in the neoliberal SSA 
than they did in the regulated capitalist SSA. 
While the regulated capitalist era was marked by restrained intercapitalist rivalry, 
in the neoliberal era capitalists faced unrestrained competition. Market principles were 
applied to the organization of the firms and in the hiring of corporate CEOs. Financial 
institutions and financial markets also played a bigger role in nonfinancial businesses, 
while the activities of financial institutions deviated from their roles under regulated 
capitalism as the trading of financial assets rapidly expanded.1  
The capital-labor accord of the previous regulated capitalist era, under which 
collective bargaining was accepted in many workplaces, ended. The relationship adjusted 
to one in which capital more fully dominated labor. Workers’ power declined, wage 
growth stagnated, and the nature of jobs changed as well. Unlike the relatively stable 
 




employment of the regulated capitalist SSA, under neoliberal capitalism jobs are more 
likely to be contingent or part-time work.  
 The dominance of market forces also became more meaningful in the 
government’s role in the economy. Kotz identifies several instances of the state’s 
transformed relationship with the economy, including in the state’s deregulation of basic 
industries and finance, the erosion of social welfare programs, enactment of tax cuts, and 
the weakening of consumer product safety, job safety, and environmental regulations.  
The particular relationship identified by Bowles et. al (1990) between U.S. 
capitalists and actors in other countries as critical to the success of the regulated capitalist 
era eroded in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Bretton Woods system, which had 
governed the postwar international economy, collapsed. In its place, a new system that 
promoted the free movement of goods, labor, and capital became entrenched, aided by 
the creation of the World Trade Organization.  
Each change noted above is coherent. They all involve the promotion of market 
forces and market regulations. As such, these institutions became mutually reinforcing. 
They were further strengthened by the change in dominant economic ideas in each 
period. Under the regulated capitalist SSA, Keynesian economic theory prevailed. The 
government was understood to have an important role in aggregate demand management 
and in promoting employment. In the new SSA of the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
however, neoliberal economic theories became the dominant framework. Neoliberal 
economic theories celebrate individual choices and the role of the market in creating 
optimal outcomes. Chapter 5 discusses how the institutions and ideas of neoliberal 
capitalism affected healthcare reform in the early 1990s. 
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Neoliberalism Under Challenge 
In 2008, the United States economy plunged into a severe financial crisis and 
economic recession. Major financial institutions, including banks, mortgage lenders, and 
insurance companies faced insolvency. Unemployment soared while hundreds of 
thousands of jobs disappeared. Domestic consumption and investment plummeted while 
the financial crisis spread globally.  
Kotz (2015, chap. 5) argues that the financial crisis and economic recession is 
best understood as a crisis in the institutional structure of neoliberal capitalism. That 
analysis identifies how the set of institutions and dominant ideas of the neoliberal SSA 
created the conditions which led to the financial and economic crises in 2008. Chapter 6 
discusses how the temporary destabilization of neoliberal institutions and ideas 
contributed to the success of the Affordable Care Act.2  
Healthcare in the SSA framework 
SSA theory provides a framework for analyzing how capitalism has developed in 
the United States following the Second World War. The following three chapters present 
case studies of how this understanding of the U.S. economy can be applied to an analysis 
of the development of the healthcare sector. What is the relationship between a healthcare 
system and the social structure of accumulation? Previous researchers using SSA theory 
have identified the role that social welfare programs and government regulations have 
within an SSA. This analysis is the first to systematically integrate an analysis of the U.S. 
healthcare system within SSA theory. Below, I explore mechanisms through which the 
 
2 For the purposes of this dissertation, it is not necessary to theorize the current state of 
the neoliberal SSA beyond 2010. However, that is an important question for future 
researchers in SSA theory and for health economics to consider.  
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healthcare system functions within the framework of the SSA theory. As noted earlier, 
capitalism is a dynamic system and as such some of these mechanisms may become more 
important than others in certain periods of an SSA. Analyzing the healthcare system 
within the logic of capitalism helps us understand the specific ways that in which they 
mutually reinforce or contradict each other. 
First, the U.S. healthcare system is an important employer, site of investment, and 
arena of consumption in the United States. Over 17 percent of US Gross Domestic 
Product is spent on healthcare (Hartman et al. 2020). In 2017, healthcare became the 
largest employer in the United States, following 27 years of increasing employment 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020). The healthcare system also operates as a site of 
capitalist accumulation and profit-making. Although industries like hospitals and health 
insurance companies originally started as predominantly nonprofit organizations, each 
industry has become increasingly characterized by more for-profit organizations. In the 
United States, hospitals and medical insurance companies are two of the most profitable 
industries (IBIS World 2020). Aspects that influence the profitability of the healthcare 
sector are government subsidies, antitrust, patent, tax, and regulatory laws, as well as 
rules about where new medical facilities be built.  
The healthcare system in the United States also has an important role in 
maintaining labor discipline. The employment-based health insurance system contributes 
to what has come to be known as “job lock.” Because most private health insurance is 
provided through employment, workers who leave or lose their job must secure an 
alternative means of health insurance. Job lock refers to this extra cost of leaving or 
changing employment for workers. Although workers may be happier or more productive 
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in other careers, the additional uncertainty of finding new health insurance may keep 
workers’ in suboptimal positions. As the prices of healthcare, pharmaceuticals, health 
insurance premiums, and insurance co-pays increase, the threat of losing a job becomes 
costlier. Having an increasingly inaccessible healthcare system helps maintain labor 
discipline and keeps workers attached to their jobs.  
Beyond its role its disciplinary roles, the healthcare system reinforces divisions 
among workers. Employer-based health insurance remains the most popular way for 
people to access private insurance, however, the number of jobs offering comprehensive 
health insurance benefits has declined. Workers who can access health insurance through 
their jobs are more likely to be in positions that require higher levels of credentials and 
are paid higher wages. The integration of the healthcare system and employment in the 
U.S. thus helps reproduce and magnify inequalities and divisions within the working 
class. Similarly, the healthcare system maintains and reproduces society’s inequalities 
based on racism, sexism, biphobia, transphobia, able-ism, and fat phobia. 
The healthcare system helps perpetuate the dominant ideology of the SSA. As 
noted above, two important aspects of neoliberal ideology are the importance of 
individual choices and free markets. The configuration of healthcare in the United States 
helps to perpetuate the highly individualist conception of society. Maintaining one’s 
health is viewed as a responsibility that every body must achieve independently. 
Individual actions and choices, such as diet and exercise, are considered as the most 
important factors in health along with genetics. The role that other larger social forces 
has, like the effects of class, race, residential segregation, and wage-labor on health, are 
largely overlooked in medicine.  
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SSA Case Studies 
The previous discussion describes some of the major mechanisms through which 
the healthcare system and the social structure of accumulation are linked. In the three 
following chapters, I analyze in more detail how these interconnections affected and 
influenced three major episodes of healthcare reform. Legislative battles have been 
critical to the development and expansion of healthcare in the United States. Highlighting 
the ways in which these legislative attempts were shaped and conditioned by the existing 
SSA yields new insights into how and why the U.S. healthcare system develops. 
Previous histories of healthcare reform, such as the ones highlighted in the 
previous chapter, exclude an analysis of the dynamics of capitalism. The following case 
studies provides a coherent explanation for some questions that the existing literature 
leaves unanswered. The deep interconnections between the social structure of 
accumulation and the development of the healthcare sector helps illuminate why 
stakeholder groups changed their positions towards healthcare reform in different 
periods, how they articulated these reforms, and why they were successful. The 
healthcare system is entrenched in capitalism. Thus, the history of capitalist development 
is deeply relevant to understanding how healthcare policy and the development of the 









CASE STUDY: CREATION OF MEDICARE AND MEDICAID (1965) 
 
Introduction 
Although the battle for a federal guarantee of healthcare for all had been ongoing 
throughout the twentieth century in the United States, it was not until the mid-1960s that 
reformers partially achieved this goal. The passage of the Social Security Amendments of 
1965, which created the programs now known as Medicare and Medicaid, catalyzed a 
huge expansion in the government guarantee of healthcare, which was unprecedented at 
the time. Since the mid-1960s, the United States has been unable to achieve another gain 
in healthcare access of this magnitude.  
There are many theories of why Medicare and the various efforts to expand 
healthcare access that followed have been successful or unsuccessful. The thesis of the 
present study is that this historic expansion of the government’s role in providing health 
insurance reflects the set of economic, political, and cultural institutions and dominant 
ideas that existed when the Social Security Amendments of 1965 were created.  
This case study proceeds as follows. First, I summarize research on the defining 
characteristics of the regulated capitalist era. Following a brief description of the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs created by the Social Security Amendments of 1965, I 
analyze the ways in which these programs reflect the regulated capitalist era. I then 
analyze how certain key interest groups responded to legislative proposals expanding 
public health insurance. For each group, I explore how their reactions to public health 
insurance programs were shaped by the coherent and complex set of institutions of the 




Defining Features of Regulated Capitalism 
As discussed in the third chapter, the form of capitalism that arose in the United 
States in the late 1940s is referred to as regulated capitalism. Kotz (2015 ch. 3) defines 
key features of the cohesive set of institutions that supported capitalist accumulation in 
this period. In this era, many jobs were stable and long-term positions. Collective 
bargaining, though not a feature of every workplace, was a widely accepted practice. The 
government was viewed as an important element of the “mixed economy” of the United 
States. The government was responsible for the regulation of key industries, as well as for 
the provision of a wide array of public goods and services. Keynesian economic theory, 
which originated during the global Great Depression, became dominant after World War 
II. Accordingly, the government had an accepted role in promoting low unemployment 
and stable price levels.  
The features of regulated capitalism were critical to the establishment of the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs. Within this set of economic, political, and cultural 
institutions and dominant ideas, the U.S. Congress was able to pass legislation creating 
large social welfare programs, which guaranteed a federal role in the provision of 
healthcare for civilians.  
The Social Security Amendments of 1965 
Before discussing the ways in which the Medicare and Medicaid programs reflect 
the institutions of regulated capitalism, it is necessary to briefly describe the overall 
structure of the legislation that created these programs. The Medicare and Medicaid 
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programs were created as amendments to the Social Security Act of 1935.3 This act was 
signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Great Depression as part of his 
New Deal legislation and established mandatory federal social insurance programs. 
Although the legislation excluded provisions for health insurance, the legislation did 
create a pension system and unemployment insurance. Workers receive a monthly 
pension payment, funded from compulsory payroll taxes, after retiring. The Medicare and 
Medicaid programs were created in 1965 as two titles amended to the original 1935 
legislation. 
Title XVIII: Health Insurance for the Aged 
Title XVIII of the Social Security Act establishes a health insurance program for 
adults over the age of 65. Subtitle A of the legislation creates what has come to be known 
as Medicare part A, which establishes a compulsory hospital insurance program. Like the 
original public pension system, Medicare part A is financed through payroll tax 
contributions from employers and workers. These payments become part of the newly 
created Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund. Payments from this trust are then sent to 
hospitals and providers to cover the cost of hospitalizations, outpatient hospital diagnostic 
services, and post-hospitalization care. The original legislation requires no premium 
payments and calls for a deductible of 40 dollars. Inpatient hospitalizations and stays at 
skilled nursing facilities require a daily coinsurance. 
The second subtitle establishes Medicare part B, a voluntary medical insurance 
program to cover the cost of physician services. Individuals over age 65 are not required, 
 
3 For information on the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935, including interest 
group support and opposition, see: (C. Gordon 1994; Klein 2003; McQuaid 1982; 
Quadagno 1988; Skocpol 1992).  
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but may choose to, enroll in this program. Revenue is collected via enrollee premiums 
and federal tax revenues. Enrollees also pay a deductible and coinsurance. A separate 
trust fund is established for the supplementary medical insurance payments to providers.  
Title XIX: Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs 
A separate title establishes the program now known as Medicaid. This title 
provides federal grants for states to establish medical assistance programs for families 
with dependent children, as well as people who are aged, blind, and permanently disabled 
if their income and resources are insufficient to cover the costs of medical care. To 
receive federal funds, states submit a plan for approval of the Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare. Each state’s plan must meet certain federal criteria, but states 
have broad flexibility in choosing the beneficiaries and benefits covered under the plan. 
The amount that the federal government provides to states depends on a state’s per-capita 
income. States with an average per-capita income equal to that of the national average 
per-capita income receive a federal payment of equal to 55 percent of the state’s 
expenses. States with the lowest per-capita income level receive as much as 83 percent of 
expenses.  
SSA Analysis 
The Medicare and Medicaid programs are uniquely structured. No previous 
proposals for reform called for the public health insurance benefits offered through three 
separate programs, each with a distinct financing mechanism. The Medicare and 
Medicaid programs are also unlike the national health insurance systems or national 
health programs in other developed countries. There are other detailed accounts of the 
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iterations of legislative compromise that preceded the law’s creation.4 This case study 
explores how the unique structure of the Medicare and Medicaid programs were shaped 
by the set of institutions supporting capitalist accumulation in this period. 
Reflections of Regulated Capitalism 
It is significant that Medicare and Medicaid were created as amendments to the 
Social Security Act of 1935, a piece of legislation central to the New Deal enacted within 
the throes of the Great Depression. As a quarter of the workforce became unemployed 
and millions of dollars of wealth generated from the stock market disappeared, the future 
sustainability of capitalism was called into question. The social reforms of the New Deal 
played a critical role in reversing the economic instability following the Depression. The 
full set of institutions of regulated capitalism, which would eventually promote capitalist 
accumulation and profitmaking, had not yet emerged in the mid-1930s. However, the 
Social Security Act was an important precursor to the regulated capitalist SSA, which 
was firmly entrenched when Medicare and Medicaid were passed. 
Following World War II, the full set of cohesive institutions promoting capitalist 
accumulation and profit-making emerged. This set of institutions featured a reliance on 
the state for stabilizing demand, regulating finance, and providing strong levels of public 
goods. Under these conditions, the Social Security Act was expanded to include public 
health insurance programs. The federal pension program established by the Social 
Security Act required a massive expansion of the government’s administrative capacity. 
The program also reaffirmed the state’s commitment to “relieving the vicissitudes of 
economic life.” Both elements of the Social Security Act reflected the dominant ideology 
 
4 See, for instance: (Corning 1969; Feingold 1966; Marmor 2000) 
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of the regulated capitalist era and were helpful in facilitating the new health insurance 
programs.  
Following the precedent established by the federal pension system, Medicare part 
A mandates that all workers and employers contribute to the program via increased taxes 
and receive a standardized set of benefits after reaching age sixty-five. The legislation 
expands government duties in the realm of private provision. The U.S. federal 
government certifies providers as eligible for reimbursement, determines the benefits that 
are covered under Medicare and determines the methods and rates of reimbursements for 
care.  
Nevertheless, within this massive expansion of the government’s role, there is an 
accompanying role for private organizations as well. Instead of mandating the expansion 
of a federal bureaucracy to handle the administration of payments and benefits, the 
legislation allows providers to select a private organization to handle and review 
payments. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare has the legal authority to 
determine the amounts paid to the providers for covered services. But it also encourages 
the Secretary “to the extent possible” contract with private organizations to perform the 
administrative duties of the program. Such duties include making decisions on the 
amounts of payments required, as well as receiving, disbursing, and accounting for the 
funds to make the payments, and auditing provider records. This reflects the importance 
of the mixed economy in the regulated capitalist SSA. In this era, there was not complete 
state control over the provision of public goods and services in the economy. However, 
there was an accepted role for the federal government to work with private businesses in 
overseeing their provision. 
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Limitations of Regulated Capitalism 
As noted above, a key feature of the regulated capitalist era was the acceptance of 
social provisioning and government regulation. Accordingly, Medicare and Medicaid, the 
largest expansions of government guaranteed healthcare in the United States, integrate 
the government involvement in the provision of healthcare services offered by private 
providers. However, the programs are still far more limited than the programs established 
by other developed nations during this time. Unlike the programs established previously 
in Canada or the United Kingdom, Medicare and Medicaid neither guaranteed universal 
health insurance coverage nor nationalized medical care. Instead, each program serves a 
limited population: individuals over 65 or people deemed medically indigent. The 
program also relies on the employment-based health insurance system.  
These limitations reflect the boundaries of the specific form of regulated 
capitalism in the United States during this period. The dominance of Keynesian ideas and 
the accepted role of public provision were important elements of the SSA that helped to 
promote capitalist accumulation and profit-making while also expanding guaranteed 
access to healthcare in the United States. Nevertheless, the form of regulated capitalism 
in the United States was less statist and accorded a big role for private businesses in 
public provision than was the case in other developed countries.  
Interest Groups 
The economic, political, and cultural institutions and dominant ideas of regulated 
capitalism shaped the Medicare and Medicaid programs. This cohesive set of institutions 
and ideas also provided the context in which various stakeholder groups perceived and 
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articulated their interests. Below, I analyze the response of selected stakeholder groups in 
the context of the regulated capitalist SSA.  
Health Insurers 
Commercial health insurance 
 In testimony and written statements submitted to Congressional Committees 
considering healthcare legislation, insurance executives maintained a dispassionate 
opposition. H. Lewis Rietz spoke on behalf of the Health Insurance Association of 
America (HIAA), the American Life Convention, Life Insurance Association of America, 
and the Life Insurers Conference and claimed to represent 525 insurance companies 
which underwrote 90 percent of private health insurance plans. He introduced the 
industry’s opposition plainly, referring to all variations of public health insurance as 
“unnecessary and undesirable”(Committee on Ways and Means 1963, pt. 2, p. 1127).  
Private health insurance coverage for the aged had rapidly increased over the last 
decade due to “public demand and keen competition” (p. 1129). Thus, government 
intervention was unnecessary since private health insurance plans could be expected to 
cover 80 percent of the elderly population within a few years if they were able to 
continue to develop and sell private policies. The expansion of private benefits was 
preferable to the expansion of public programs since private insurers were better suited to 
meet the diverse needs of the elderly population. Rietz questioned the capability of the 
government to forecast the costs of their proposal accurately. He noted that the actuaries 
of the companies he represented predicted much larger costs than what the government 
actuaries had calculated.  
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Rietz also argued that the financial problems of senior citizens were overstated 
and not a problem that required a federal solution: 
“… our aged are not destitute old people and they can provide their 
majority of their needs. We have an element of family responsibility. I 
do not think this is anything we ought to be ashamed of in the society we 
live in” (ibid., p. 1157). 
 
Robert Neal, the chief lobbyist of the Health Insurance Association of America, 
later described his organization’s subtle campaign against reform: 
“We felt our only defense to it [a Medicare law] was performance. 
Companies don’t have very much political leverage. So our effort was to 
try to supply what information we could on probable costs and what we 
were doing – in terms of how fast we were getting people covered … We 
felt with time on our side … we could eventually get the job done 
privately” (Neal 1967). 
Private health insurance executives did not support any proposal for healthcare 
reform in this period. They also notably did not launch a public campaign against reform 
in this period. Individual health insurance companies continued to run advertisements for 
their private health insurance plans, specifically targeted to expanding coverage to older 
people.5 Post card campaigns, political organizing, and public campaigns on behalf of the 
industry were considered “a waste of time” according to Neal (Neal 1967, 42). Instead 
the trade organizations encouraged insurance executives to contact their Congressional 
representatives to register individual opposition to public programs.6  
 
5 These advertisements were not always directed towards elderly audiences. One 
advertisement, which was referenced in Congressional testimony, was directed to adult 
children of elderly people. They were encouraged to “give mother a policy for Mother’s 
Day” (Committee on Ways and Means 1963, pt. 2, p. 1157).  
6 In an interview following the enactment of Medicare, Robert Neal described this action 
as part of a “grass roots” organizing strategy (Neal 1967, 42–43). 
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Commercial insurer’s reactions to proposals to create a federally funded program 
to finance health insurance for senior citizens reflect the set of institutions that jointly 
promoted capitalist accumulation in this period. Insurance executives opted to lobby 
privately and without a public campaign. There is evidence that the subtle lobbying 
technique of health insurers in this period was because of their assumption that a public 
campaign to defend against federal intervention would garner their organization a 
negative public opinion and ultimately would hurt their business. Chapin (2010, 156) 
argues that avoiding a negative perception was a critical part of the organization’s 
strategy fighting healthcare reform during the Truman administration. Similarly, Gordon 
(2004, 240) cites internal communication of HIAA members noting that “few politicians 
will want to take on the doctors, but this same restraint will not apply in the case of large 
insurance corporations.” 
The insurer’s perception of the risks of public lobbying against healthcare reform 
for seniors by insurance companies is consistent with the set of economic, political, and 
cultural institutions and dominant ideas of the regulated capitalist era. Reviving capitalist 
accumulation and economic stability following the Great Depression required the 
establishment of a cohesive set of institutions, of which a central feature was the 
acceptance of the state’s role in the provision of goods and services. In these conditions, 
private insurance companies worried about the adverse consequences for their industry if 
they were perceived as overstepping their role. Accordingly, their opposition to 
healthcare reform in this period was muted.  
Because of the important role of the state in regulated capitalism, market forces 
were not automatically presumed to be a superior method of allocation. As noted by Kotz 
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(2015), the U.S. economy in this period was often referred to as a “mixed economy.” 
This term highlights the importance of private market forces operating alongside of, and 
regulated by, the state. This helps to explain the arguments used by insurance executives 
in this period. Insurance executives dedicated a large portion of their testimony 
explaining their opposition to public health insurance programs in this period with 
explanations of their industry’s successes. Unlike in other periods of healthcare reform, 
simply identifying a reform proposal as a “government run” program was not considered 
an effective criticism by HIAA representatives. Instead, insurance executives presented 
data on the rapid growth of their industry within the last two decades. They argued that 
although they had not yet sold adequate private insurance coverage to people over 65 
years old, that their business could do so with time.  
Some insurance companies responded to legislative discussion of public health 
insurance programs by creating new products and new ways of selling these products. In 
1961, two insurance companies, Continental Casualty and Mutual of Omaha, introduced 
new health plans for people over 65 on an area-wide basis with a minimum of 
underwriting restrictions.7 As the legislative pressure continued for expanding public 
health benefits, insurance companies began to work together to expand private coverage 
for the aged within their states. In 1961, insurance companies in Connecticut lobbied 
their state legislature for the ability to pool their resources so that they could cooperate to 
sell health insurance to the aged. Having succeeded in gaining approval from the State, 
over forty Connecticut-based insurance companies pooled their resources and staffs to     
 
7 This history and discussion of these health plans, often known as the State 65 health 




create the Connecticut 65 Health Insurance Association. Because of the regulatory 
structure of insurance markets, insurance companies in each state had to lobby their state 
legislatures for the legal authority to form such cooperative ventures. By the time 
Medicare was passed in July 1965, there were seven such cooperative plans operating in 
eight states. 
On behalf of all the member companies, one company was selected to run the 
Association and issue health insurance policies to people over 65. Each member company 
put in funds to launch the Association and pay for initial advertising campaigns. Risk was 
shared between all companies in proportion to the size of their business within the state.  
Morton Miller, the chief insurance executive of Equitable Insurance Company 
and President of the New York 65 Health Insurance Association, described the 
development and promotion of these State 65 plans as an “immediate response” to the 
AFL-CIO’s support of social insurance for the elderly (Miller 1967, 18). He expected that 
this cooperative solution could potentially forestall public health insurance reform: 
 “…if we had been given time and if the legislative situation hadn’t 
changed, undoubtedly, in my opinion, we would have done this country 
wide—to be able to combine the companies in a pool to do this” (ibid., 
p. 20).  
In fact, the New York 65 health insurance plans were selected by a few districts as 
a mechanism for providing benefits for certain welfare beneficiaries. Morton also thought 
the State 65 health plans could be adapted as part of potential reforms (ibid., p. 29).   
 The defense of private insurance companies against federal reforms in this 
period reflect the concurrent set of institutions supporting capitalist accumulation. In the 
period of regulated capitalism, having a privately oriented market was not understood to 
be an obviously superior to federal intervention. Insurance executives argued that their 
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industry could and would expand to provide coverage to most of the elderly population. 
Instead of pooling their resources to finance a campaign to persuade the public of the 
dangers of public insurance or the benefits of the private markets, insurance executives in 
this period used a historically unique strategy. They pooled their resources and worked 
cooperatively, rather than in competition with each other, to establish a broader private 
market in health insurance. Yet their efforts and arguments were not convincing in the 
regulated capitalist period. Instead of waiting for the private insurance market to continue 
to expand, as it had done over the last two decades, the Congress ultimately passed 
legislation, which would establish a public insurance program.  
Of course, not all health insurance executives joined cooperative insurance 
alliances to try to delay federal reforms. There is evidence that other insurance executives 
were ambivalent or even welcomed public intervention in this period. For instance, 
Gordon (2004, 240) finds that some HIAA members thought supporting Medicare 
proposals would prove to ultimately beneficial in helping to stave off future reforms for 
people under age 65. The enactment of a national health insurance program was a 
reasonable fear. President Truman strongly supported such a proposal in 1948. By 1952, 
the Democratic Party platform included discussion of the prohibitive costs of medical 
care. The 1960 and 1964 platforms explicitly called for the public provision of medical 
care benefits through the Social Security system. (Peters and Woolley n.d.) Thus, health 
insurance executives had reason to support Medicare reforms. Not only would the 
reforms subsidize the most expensive group of insurance beneficiaries, but it might also 
help protect the industry against the viable threat of more comprehensive future reforms.  
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In a November 1963 hearing, the positive positions of several insurance company 
executives towards proposals for medical care for the aged are recited as well. 
Representative King references statements from officials of the Nationwide Insurance 
Company and Continental Insurance Company, which each suggest that the health 
insurance industry would not be hurt, and could possibly be stimulated by, a public 
program (Committee on Ways and Means 1963, pt. 2, p. 1202).  
These views are dismissed by the representative of the Health Insurance 
Association of America as “minority views of a very limited group of people” (ibid.) It is 
worth considering the possibility that other insurance executives may have held a secret 
affinity for reform.  Even if such a view were widely believed by all insurance executives 
in this period, it is still compatible with the established social structure of accumulation.  
As noted above, at that time large expansion of the private health insurance 
industry had occurred within the last two decades, simultaneous with the entrenchment of 
the institutions of regulated capitalism. Thus, it is reasonable for health insurance 
executives in this period to not immediately couple a stronger state role in insurance with 
the demise of their industry. The deepening of regulated capitalism had so far proved 
compatible with the expansion and growing profitability of their industry. The subtle 
opposition of insurance executives such as Rietz and Miller reflects this knowledge. 
Their testimony did not imply that federal intervention would be detrimental to their 
industry or threaten mass lay-offs. Their arguments acknowledged the recent success of 
the industry and promised future expansions.  
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Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
Neither Blue Cross nor Blue Shield were members of the Health Insurance 
Associate of America, but the companies covered a large share of the privately insured. 
The two companies, often jointly referred to as the Blues, lobbied and operated distinctly 
from the rest of the private insurance market. The Blues’ health plans covered hospital 
services (Blue Cross) and physician services (Blue Shield) using community rating, 
meaning that all local enrollees were charged the same rates. Because the other insurance 
companies did not have status as a tax-exempt organization, they were not required to use 
community rating and could charge enrollees different rates. This allowed the non-tax-
exempt private insurance companies to charge higher rates to the enrollees who were 
expected to use more healthcare.8  
Accordingly, commercial insurers appealed to enrollees who were not expected to 
use many healthcare services, often younger people without chronic illnesses. Experience 
rating allowed them to receive the same insurance benefits, but with lower premium 
costs. As more commercial insurers followed the Blues into the market, the Blues were 
faced with a cycle of higher medical costs, higher premiums, and an increasingly 
expensive population to insure.  
This situation placed the Blues in a unique position during the battles for national 
health insurance reform. Competition with the experience-rated plans left the community-
rated plans, and many of their beneficiaries, in precarious financial positions. The Blues 
had to defend themselves from possibility of a national health insurance plan but also 
 
8 In this discussion, I use the term commercial insurers to refer to the non-tax-exempt 
private insurance companies. 
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knew that the current status-quo in private insurance markets might not be viable. Thus, 
they had to maintain the dual position of promoting private insurance over public 
insurance, while simultaneously defending themselves from the private competition.  
Their lobbying strategy in the years preceding Medicare’s passage responded to 
both threats. Like the commercial insurers, the Blues publicly contended that the recent 
increase in private insurance coverage proved that any expansions to federal health 
insurance program were unwarranted and unwanted. In January of 1962, Blue Cross 
announced “a historic decision … to finance a program of comprehensive health-care 
benefits for the aged.” Later in the year, the organization followed up with large 
advertisements in several major publications, announcing their expanded health plans for 
people over 65. However, unlike the commercial insurers’ State 65 plans, the increased 
plans for the elderly never materialized (Harris 1966a, 135–50). 
While promising future private benefits and coverage to the elderly, the 
executives of the Blues plans also positioned themselves to administer any future 
expansions in public health insurance benefits. The 1960 Kerr-Mills bill, a precursor to 
Medicaid program that provided limited federal funding for state and local governments 
to provide insurance to elderly poor citizens, was sufficient and “essentially right” 
according to the Executive Director of the National Association of Blue Shield Plans 
(Committee on Ways and Means 1963, pt. 4, p. 1945). Any further legislation, in the 
opinion of both Blue Cross and Blue Shield executives, should focus on improving the 
existing Kerr-Mills program. The Blue Shield executive suggested a possible means of 
improving the program: 
“We can demonstrate the practicality of utilizing Blue Shields Plans as 
underwriters of the services to be provided the needy elder citizens 
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through the Kerr-Mills program. We in Blue Shield would welcome a 
much broader opportunity to make our contribution to this program.” 
(ibid.). 
 
The Blues were unsuccessful in expanding private health insurance coverage to 
the elderly, but ultimately shifted their strategy of protecting their industry in the 1960s to 
promoting their capability for administering federally funded health insurance plans. The 
Blues emphasized their institution’s civically driven branding and their history and 
knowledge of the industry. From their perspective, an ideal policy would not expand 
federal coverage for the entire over-65 population, but only those who were unable to 
purchase private insurance. Such a program would be financed by the government but 
underwritten and administered by the private Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans (ibid.). 
As private insurers, the Blues were undermined by their inability to use 
experience-ratings. Yet, as tax-exempt non-profit institutions, the Blues were well-
positioned to solicit a large role in administering a public insurance program. Like 
commercial insurers, threat of legislation in this period did not incite the insurers into a 
public campaign against reform. Facing the problems of the competitive marketplace, the 
Blues were more explicit in identifying the possible advantages of an expanded public 
role in their industry. They were able to more effectively shape  the Medicare and 
Medicaid program to their interests. The institutions of the regulated capitalist era, under 
which the government was understood to have a major role in providing public goods 
alongside of private companies, was critical to the Blues’ success despite their 




The American Medical Association (AMA), a professional organization 
representing doctors, opposed all variations of national health insurance proposals in the 
first half of the twentieth century. Starr (1982) argues that the medical profession’s long-
standing dedication to the principle of doctor-patient sovereignty led them to fear federal 
health reform. The AMA protested that government interventions threatened their 
professional autonomy. In the early 1960s, as several bills establishing Medicare-type 
programs were discussed in the Congress, the doctors maintained a fierce opposition.  
The AMA, originally founded in 1847, had deep-rooted institutional advantages 
in their fight against government insurance for the aged. By the early 1960s, the 
organization of two hundred thousand members had established a political action 
committee, a Washington, D.C. lobbying office with twenty-three staff members, and a 
Chicago headquarters with nine hundred other employees, including seventy publicists 
(Harris 1966a, 2). The well-resourced group took the opposite approach from health 
insurers and deployed an aggressive and very public campaign against healthcare reform. 
The AMA’s Operation Coffee Cup is one such example of the organization’s 
educational campaigns to dissuade the public against publicly financed medical care for 
the aged. Doctors’ wives were encouraged to invite friends and neighbors over for coffee 
and cookies. While guests snacked, the host would play a vinyl recording of Ronald 
Reagan excoriating the evils of government interference in medicine: 
“One of the traditional methods of imposing statist socialism on a people 
has been by way of medicine. It’s very easy to disguise a medical 
program as a humanitarian project.” (qtd. in ibid., p. 139). 
 
50 
The organization also used traditional media methods. They ran full page ads in 
every major city’s daily newspaper and in the major weekly magazines. Quarter-page ads 
ran in hundreds of smaller cities’ daily newspapers. Similarly, the AMA purchased 
hundreds of local television advertisement spots to run along with national one minute 
advertisements (C. Gordon 2004, 235).  
Their opposition was resolute, even proposals that subsidized the elderly’s 
purchase of private health insurance benefits underwritten by private health insurers was 
considered “essentially the same as compulsory health insurance” and the end of free 
enterprise in medicine (qtd. in ibid., p. 234). It was not until 1962 that the organization 
indicated a possible willingness to accept federal subsidies to the non-profit Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield health plans to expand coverage for the needy aged (Corning 1969). Any 
government intervention beyond assistance to those with the most need was not only 
deemed socialist, but also unnecessary and harmful.  
Like the private insurers, in Congressional hearings the AMA took issue with the 
premise that there was any problem in the distribution of healthcare. Private markets, 
they claimed, already provided the correct amount of paid care work at the highest 
quality. Dr. Edward Annis, president of the organization, argued that the current private 
health insurance system was sufficient since more than half of Americans over 65 had 
met “individual responsibilities without recourse to a broad Federal aid program” 
(Committee on Ways and Means 1963, pt. 2, p. 644). Further, the tales of financial 
vulnerability of elderly Americans were dramatically overstated. Although they conceded 
that elderly Americans do experience a decline in family income, they reasoned that they 
also had fewer expenses, since “many of the aged have retired and thus escape expenses 
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for transportation, lunches, clothing, and other needs incident to employment” (ibid., p. 
645).  
Doctors also predicted that government involvement in medicine would have 
adverse effects on the quality of care for all people. Instead of helping people, the AMA 
argued that Medicare would “impos[e] centralized direction which would frustrate the 
striving for professional excellence” and “result in a loss of able entrants to the healthcare 
field because of Government controls over medicine” (ibid., p. 649). The doctors argued 
that public payment for healthcare would cause American doctors “to feel there is less 
need for them to give of their talent and time to help the needy” and thus would cause an 
“incalculable loss” to older patients (ibid.).  
Despite the advantages of their industry and the pervasiveness of their public 
campaigns, the AMA faced new obstacles in the early and mid-1960s. The set of 
institutions underpinning capitalist accumulation had transformed and were no longer 
compatible with many of the AMA’s arguments. The claims of the private market’s 
ability to solve problems in healthcare were no longer effective. During this period, the 
need for government intervention to correct market failures and regulate major industries 
was well established. Arguments connecting healthcare reforms to socialism were 
similarly futile. The Social Security Program, a federal pension system established after 
the Great Depression, had proven successful and dependable and had so far not ushered 
in a socialist regime. Alternatively, over the last two decades, the U.S. economy had 




By the fall of 1964, the Medicare-like proposal of the King-Anderson bill pass in 
both the House and the Senate but could not be settled in conference committee (Corning 
1969).9 Undeterred, in a December 1964 meeting, the AMA voted and recommitted to 
another public campaign opposing the legislation. Yet early in 1965, the AMA switched 
their tactics and introduced their first formal counterproposal. Their proposal, named 
Eldercare, would use general federal and state revenues to subsidize private health 
insurance policies for elderly people. Although the proposal itself was not revolutionary, 
the AMA surprised observers by advertising their proposal as more generous than the 
other Medicare proposals being considered.10 At a special session of the AMA House of 
Delegates, the legislation was introduced as 
“… founded on a concept that a broad spectrum of benefits should be 
included in any health care program for the elderly, and those who 
require assistance in financing their health care expenses should receive 
whatever help may be needed” (“AMA House Backs Eldercare Program, 
Asks Study of Kerr-Mills Expansion” 1965). 
 
The organization’s change in attitude towards government funded health benefits 
for the elderly did not go unnoted. Congressman Udall from Arizona mocked the group’s 
transformed beliefs: 
“Friends, you know that problem we said didn’t exist? Well, it does exist 
and it is very, very serious. While we told you that Medicare was 
socialized medicine and should be defeated, we now recognize that it 
should be defeated only because it doesn’t go far enough. The Congress 
should do more for our older citizens and pass our Eldercare bill instead” 
(Udall 1965). 
 
9 H.R. 11865 The bill proposed to expand the Old Age Survivor and Disability Insurance 
program to cover hospital benefits for all people over 65, with an increase in the social 
security taxes.  
10 Corning (1969) notes that such a plan was originally proposed in the Taft-Smith-
Hartley bill of 1946. 
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The group’s inconsistency did not seem to hurt the public popularity of the 
Eldercare proposal: it was given wide publicity and immediately introduced in the House 
of Representatives (Corning 1969). The President of the AMA later described the 
proposal as “the most successful we ever had” and claimed that 
 “the mail was running as much as 15 to 1 in some states to as high as 50 
to 1 against King-Anderson Medicare in favor of Eldercare” (Annis 
1967, 43). 
 
The organization may have intended for their Eldercare proposal to be  a 
replacement for bills financing a universal benefit for aged people financed out of social 
security. However, the universal hospital care benefit financed out of social security taxes 
became Medicare part A. Historians have noted that the other parts of the bill, Medicare 
part B and Medicaid, reflect parts of the Eldercare proposal. Corning (1969) recalled that 
the claims that Eldercare had more comprehensive benefits “served to goad the Ways and 
Means Committee into expanding the scope of the Medicare bill.” Eldercare is also 
reflected in Title 19 of the legislation, which provides broad hospital and physician care 
for poor people without financing from Social Security Act (Cohen 1985).   
The later success of the AMA’s Eldercare proposal is consistent with the 
established regulated capitalist SSA. Having spent the first few years of the Medicare 
debate comparing the legislation as a communist threat to free enterprise, the 
organization’s active publicity and lobbying earned them few inroads with politicians and 
public sentiment. In a last-minute effort, the organization supported federally subsidized 
comprehensive health benefits for all the elderly through private insurers. The more 
generous plan raised their public and political support but was ultimately melded with the 




Representatives from large corporations do not appear on the lists of public 
witnesses at the 88th or 89th Congressional Ways and Means Committee’s hearings 
regarding medical care for the aged. Big business groups also did not send any 
representatives to the Senate Finance Committee’s hearings or submit written material for 
any of the accompanying public records. Outside the Congressional testimonies, an 
established record of big business’s opinions on Medicare proposals remains difficult to 
locate. A description of the Committee for Economic Development (CED)’s statements 
and research reports include no mention of proposals for medical care for the aged. As 
Swenson (2015)and others demonstrate, big business groups, who had previously 
supported Republican candidates, lent a lot of financial support to Johnson’s campaign in 
the 1964 election. Many authors discuss the close relationship that President Johnson 
maintained throughout his presidency with these groups, specifically the Business 
Council, an organization of CEOs from the largest firms in the country. However, within 
these histories there are no specific details on how the logistics of healthcare reform 
played into this relationship. 
Even without explicit references to Medicare programs, many journalists of the 
era commented on what they considered an unexpected shift in big business’s attitudes 
towards the Great Society programs or government intervention more broadly. A 1966 
Fortune article that discusses a “rapprochement” between government and business 
makes the following observation: 
“Today the scope of federal action cannot be specifically defined by 
categories (e.g., defense and foreign affairs). The federal government 





In a 1967 Harvard Business Review article, Thomas Levitt makes a similar point 
regarding a new and unexpected relationship between government and business, naming 
it “the almost total reversal of the business community’s attitudes” (p. 118). His article, 
“The Johnson Treatment,” emphatically makes the case: 
“It may seem the height of grandiloquence to say so, but there is 
abundant evidence that the American business community has finally 
and with unexpected suddenness actively embraced the idea of the 
interventionist state. … [I]mportant elements of American business have 
now come to the clear conclusion that the federal government can and 
probably should be an active agent of social and economic betterment – 
not just that big government is here to stay, but that government bigness 
is not automatically badness and that the rising governmentalization of 
our social and economic affairs can indeed ameliorate our lives and 
improve our society” (Levitt 1967, 114). 
 
This sentiment, as well as the divide between small and large businesses, is 
further articulated in a 1966 article of The New Republic: 
“A new breed of corporate executive is on the scene, professionally 
trained and more oriented to the science of management than to the 
perpetuation of an ideology which looks upon government as 
intrinsically evil. The modern company officer accepts government 
(much like he accepts the labor union) and works actively with it, seeking 
to take full advantage of the opportunities it offers and striving to 
influence the policies it adopts” (Harris 1966b). 
 
Big business representatives did not aggressively campaign either for or against, 
but tacitly accepted, government provision of health insurance for older Americans. 
Swenson himself notes that big business had little to lose from offering explicitly public 
support for Medicare but “only social and economic risks of looking too liberal in the 
eyes of much of the business community” (Swenson 2015, 10). Gordon (2004, 238 n70) 
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identifies large employer’s foresightedness in wanting to maintain the insurance and 
pharmaceutical agencies as political allies for future battles.  
The following exchange between an AFL-CIO representative from New York a 
member of the Congressional Ways and Means Committee at the 1964 hearings on the 
King-Anderson legislation supports the tacit agreement of big business. The King-
Anderson bill called for hospital insurance for the aged financed through increased social 
security tax revenues split between employer and employees. The AFL-CIO 
representative from District 65 of the Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union 
read a statement in support of the immediate passage of the King-Anderson legislation 
with the goal “that provision ultimately be made for every aspect of medical service and 
techniques and facilities involved in maintaining people in good health” (Committee on 
Ways and Means 1963, 334). Afterward the statement, Mr. Curtis, a Representative from 
Missouri on the committee, asks the union representative, “Let me ask one question. I 
want to be sure that you are speaking for the union and not the 1,500 employers, or are 
you speaking for both?” (p. 336). The union representative responds: 
“I believe I can say reliably, however, that this view generally represents 
the feelings of most of our employers. This matter has been discussed at 
meetings of our labor-management board of trustees. While they have 
not gone on record officially, I believe that is their general feeling” (p. 
336). 
 
Features unique to the regulated capitalist era of this time made this unspoken 
agreement possible. After the period of labor strife in the early twentieth century, a 
capitalist-labor accord as well as the accepted role for government regulation was 
required for continued capitalist accumulation.  
 
57 
This logic corresponds to several of the features of the era of regulated capitalism 
and supports the thesis that the dominant form of capitalism shaped group’s arguments 
and attitudes regarding health care reform. In the SSA of the regulated capitalist era, even 
though big business owners were not enthusiastic about the proposed healthcare reforms, 
they did not publicly oppose the legislation. Public opposition from large business 
owners would have been antithetical to the era’s compromise between big business and 
labor. As was noted above, after a period of labor strife following the 1930s, the leaders 
of big businesses accepted unions and the norms of collective bargaining as well as 
existing social programs such as social security, unemployment insurance, and a 
Keynesian low-unemployment program (Kotz, 2015, p. 58). Since labor and consumer 
groups, such as the AFL-CIO, were strongly supportive of Medicare, a public campaign 
from large business owners against the legislation would have been threatening to the 
stability of the compromise. Having determined that Medicare did not pose a threat to 
their profits, big business leaders, including those in the health insurance industry, 
apparently decided that risking the stability of the compromise that underpinned the 
successful capitalist accumulation of this era was not in their interest.  
Small Business 
Small businesses did not join the capital-labor compromise and did not have the 
power or influence that big businesses had.11 They were also ineffective in their fight 
against healthcare reform. Representatives from small business organizations made 
 
11 Small businesses face different conditions than large businesses, which explains their 
absence from the capital-labor compromise. Small businesses face low profit rates and 
fierce competition. Unlike big business they do not expect to have much influence over a 
government that becomes interventionist. 
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several statements before the committee hearings on the King-Anderson legislation. 
Representatives from the Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers 
(NAM), and National Restaurant Association (NRA) shared similar arguments. These 
representatives from small businesses argued that the proposed additional tax burden of 
the legislation was not only excessively heavy, but also unfair in principle.  
Karl Schlotterbeck, representative from the Chamber of Commerce, argued that 
because Medicare benefits would be available to people who were still working, that this 
redistribution was inappropriate (Committee on Ways and Means 1963, pt. 3, p. 1622). 
Representatives from the NRA and the American Hotel and Motel Association argued 
that their profit rates were so small that the additional payroll taxes would put them out of 
business, force employee layoffs, and encourage the use of automation to replace labor 
costs (Committee on Ways and Means 1963, 2459 part 5). Representatives from the 
NAM warned that this legislation would usher in a new era of “socialized medicine” (p. 
2450). The Junior Chamber of Commerce feared that the government provision of 
healthcare benefits would “push private enterprise out” of the United States entirely 
(Committee on Ways and Means 1963, pt. 4, p. 2008) 
Many representatives from small businesses argued that the proposed government 
legislation demonstrated a lack of trust for individual Americans. A representative from 
the Junior Chamber of Commerce articulated this viewpoint emphatically: 
“We believe the overwhelming majority of Americans hunger and thirst 
for someone who will recognize their moral, spiritual, and physical 
strength, who will treat them not as vassals or helpless dependents, but 
as self-reliant, self-supporting freemen with the courage to adventure and 




Representatives from the National Retail Federation repeated the argument that 
the King-Anderson legislation 
 “is nothing more than a basic mistrust of individual choice … saying 
that individuals cannot be trusted to provide voluntarily for their own 
medical care when confronted with other temptations” (Committee on 
Ways and Means 1963, pt. 5, p. 2459). 
 
But in the era of regulated capitalism, small business owners did not have the 
same political power and weight of the large business groups. The argument that publicly 
provided health insurance for elderly people constituted a gross violation of individual 
rights was ineffective. The importance of individual decision-making was important but 
limited under the regulated capitalist SSA. Their arguments ran counter to the dominant 
ideas of the SSA, which supported a social safety net for individuals who did not fare 
well in the market economy.  
Labor and Citizen Groups 
Another key part of regulated capitalism that was critical to the creation of 
Medicare and Medicaid was the heightened power of organized labor. Following the 
Second World War, a new set of power relations governed the relationship between 
capital and labor in the United States (D. Gordon, Weisskopf, and Bowles 1996). This 
new set of power relations is often referred to as the capital-labor accord. Kotz (2015) 
argues that renewed labor militancy during the Great Depression, along with other factors 
after World War II, led a critical mass of big business leaders to agree to a compromise 
with organized labor. The compromise accepted collective bargaining and supported 
government efforts to maintain a low unemployment rate (p. 58).  
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Gordon, Weisskopf, and Bowles (1996) analyze empirical evidence of the degree 
of power exerted by labor over capital during this period. The authors calculate an index 
of the capitalist’s power over labor from the expected reduction in income following job 
loss. They compare this to an index of worker’s resistance to capital, based on the 
percentage of union members involved in strikes, the ratio of quits to layoffs in 
manufacturing, and the proportion of strikes primarily motivated on issues of workplace 
demands. Tracking these indicators over time, the authors conclude that capitalists lost 
considerable power over workers during the 1960s, which they were able to begin to 
recapture in the 1970s and 1980s (pp. 141-142). 
Thus, the capital-labor accord was not a period of tranquility and total agreement 
between classes; labor strife continued. However, the accepted role of labor in collective 
bargaining made it possible for labor to win important concessions during this period. A 
stronger working class shifted the income distribution in its favor during this period. 
Quadagno (2006) describes how the newly merged American Federal of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) was at the forefront of fighting for 
expanded federal disability benefits in 1956. In the early 1960s, the United Auto Workers 
(UAW) successfully negotiated for the full payment of health insurance premiums for 
retirees in the early 1960s.  
Following these victories, organized labor prioritized guaranteed health insurance 
for the aged. The AFL-CIO offices became a self-described headquarters for the cause. 
Their Social Security Department worked on crafting a Medicare bill, as well as drafting 
speeches and talking points for members of Congress who supported the cause 
(Quadagno, 2006, p. 53). The AFL-CIO also created and financed the Physician’s 
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Committee, an organization of doctors that supported Medicare and rebuked the fierce 
opposition of the American Medical Association (AMA). The National Council of Senior 
Citizens, another group organized by the AFL-CIO, represented the main beneficiaries of 
a possible Medicare program. The group organized effective petition drives and letter-
writing campaigns, published campaign materials on the details and necessity of 
Medicare, and organized testimony for related Congressional hearings (pp. 52-55). 
Organized labor played a large role in formulating what became Medicare part A. 
Quadagno notes, “there is little doubt trade unions paved the way for the final Medicare 
vote” (p. 56). Yet their role was limited in several ways. Ultimately, labor groups had 
little say in the creation of Medicare part B or the Medicaid program, which were the 
result of a last minute legislative compromise by Wilbur Mills (Quadagno, 2006). 
Following the ousting of communist labor leaders in the 1940s, trade unions 
fought cautiously for health insurance for the aged. They were careful to frame their 
demands without threatening the order of the capital-labor accord. The testimony of the 
President of the AFL-CIO, George Meany, to the Ways and Means Committee hearings 
on Medicare legislation in 1964 reflects their submission. Meany argued that private 
health insurance plans were expanding but were doomed to fail to ever provide affordable 
enough coverage for elderly people. He argued that a government program was necessary 
“not for its own sake” but “only when other means have proved to be inadequate” 
(Committee on Ways and Means 1963, pt. 3). 
The boundaries and institutions of the regulated capitalist era are reflected in 
labor’s fight and support for health insurance for the aged. Just as workers accepted 
capitalists’ control and management over production in exchange for bargaining power, 
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they also continued to accept private health insurance benefits in exchange for guaranteed 
public provision of benefits for the aged. Similarly, big business groups were also 
cautious to not threaten the capital-labor accord. Many big business leaders neither 
openly advocated for nor against federally funded medical insurance for the aged.  
Conclusion 
Histories of the passage of Medicare miss the importance of the regulated 
capitalist era on the passage of this legislation. Understanding the institutions of regulated 
capitalism helps explain why it was at this particular time that the U.S. was able to 
successfully pass major public healthcare legislation. In this era, Keynesian ideas were 
prominent, there was an accepted role for government in social provisioning and 
regulating, and labor unions had an acknowledged role in bargaining with capitalists as 
well. Each of these institutions shaped the environment in which Medicare was passed 
and enacted. Warnings about of socialized medicine or government control over doctors 
were ineffective. Understanding the private market as unable to offer a private insurance 
coverage for elderly people was compelling. Labor and citizen groups effectively 
organized for and promoted increased public benefits and security. This joint 
constellation of institutions was effective in allowing for the greatest expansion of 
publicly provided U.S. health insurance. Examining the relationship between regulated 
capitalism and Medicare is also helpful for explaining the quite different outcomes for 





CASE STUDY: THE FAILURE OF THE HEALTH SECURITY ACT 1993-1994 
 
Introduction 
On September 23 of 1993, President Clinton addressed the U.S. Congress to 
announce his promised proposal for healthcare reform. His proposal, called the Health 
Security Act (HSA), became a center of political debate for the next ten months. 
However, it ultimately never made it to a floor vote in the House or Senate. In this case 
study, I analyze how the set of economic, political, and cultural institutions and dominant 
ideas of the period contributed to the health reform’s defeat.  
The case study is organized as follows. The first section briefly discusses the 
characteristics of the neoliberal SSA. I then consider the ways in which the institutions 
and ideas of neoliberal capitalism shaped and limited the discussion of healthcare reform 
in the 1990s, particularly the Clinton administration’s proposal for reform. Next, I 
analyze how certain key groups, representing insurance companies, businesses owners, 
and labor and citizen groups participated in the discussion of healthcare reforms in this 
period. I show how the neoliberal SSA shaped these groups’ perceived interests, the ways 
in which they articulated these interests, and their ultimate degree of success.  
Neoliberal Capitalism 
As discussed in chapter three, the neoliberal SSA emerged out of the crisis of the 
regulated capitalist SSA. In the conflict that followed the destabilization of the 
institutions and ideas of the previous era, a coalition of small and large business groups 
coalesced to reverse the concessions of regulated capitalism and to restore their 
profitability (Kotz 2015). By the late 1970s, the U.S. economy had undergone structural 
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changes. A cohesive set of economic, political, and cultural institutions and ideas of the 
neoliberal SSA, which would restore successfully restore capitalist accumulation for the 
coming decades, were consolidated.  
The new SSA was markedly different from its predecessor: Keynesian economic 
theories were displaced in favor of neoliberal economic theories that emphasized 
individual choice and the uninhibited operation of markets. The privileged role of market 
forces in allocation replaced the role of the state and collective bargaining, which had 
been central to the allocation of resources in the regulated capitalist SSA. The capital-
labor relation had been transformed to one in which labor is fully dominated by capital. 
By the early 1990s, when the details of the Clinton Health Security Act were announced, 
each of these institutions was well entrenched.  
Clinton Health Security Act 
Although ultimately unsuccessful, the Health Security Act became a defining part 
of the Clinton administration’s legacy. The thirteen-hundred-page proposal would have 
dramatically changed the financing and delivery of private and public healthcare. The 
legislation was never voted on, much less enacted, but it nevertheless remains a landmark 
event in the development of U.S. health policy. The design of the HSA was the focal 
point of the healthcare debate; many of the competing healthcare bills debated 
simultaneously were modifications of the system proposed by President Clinton.  
This episode of healthcare form has motivated a large body of research into the 
causes and consequences of its demise. However, the existing literature has not yet 
analyzed this episode of healthcare reform in the context of the changing structures of 
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capitalism. Before proceeding to this analysis, it is necessary to broadly describe major 
policy elements of the Clinton Health Security Act.12 
Title I: Health Care Security 
The first title of the HSA consists of ten subtitles, which specify the proposals that 
have become the law’s hallmarks. Title I defines the new responsibilities that insurers, 
states, the federal government, and employers would be responsible for under the new 
law.  
There are major new regulations for private health insurance. The law establishes 
a mandatory comprehensive benefit package that all health plans must offer to anyone 
who enrolls. No exclusions or limitations of coverage for pre-existing conditions or other 
reasons would be allowed. Each health plan would use community rating to price their 
insurance. They would also need to offer three schedules for cost sharing. The lowest cost 
schedule includes no deductible or copayment for any in-network providers. Enrollees in 
this cost sharing plan may see out-of-network providers with a coinsurance of no less 
than twenty percent of the cost of the visit.13 The higher cost sharing plan charges a 
deductible and coinsurance for services. The final plan, called the combination plan, uses 
the low-cost sharing schedule for in-network providers and the high-cost schedule for 
out-of-network providers. In all schedules, enrollees would face the same out-of-pocket 
limits. 
 
12 Unless otherwise stated, when I refer to the Health Security Act, I am specifically 
referencing H.R. 3600/S. 1757. 




Each state would be responsible for establishing a regional health alliance. These 
alliances could be operated as non-profit organizations, an independent state agency, or 
an agency of the state. Each alliance would be governed by a Board of Directors, which 
would be made up of equal numbers of employers and employees who purchase 
healthcare from the alliance. The health alliances would be responsible for establishing 
and publishing the criteria used to certify which insurers could sell their health plans 
within the region. Every alliance would offer a traditional fee-for-service plan and 
establish a fee schedule. 
Ultimately each regional health alliance facilitates the purchase of health 
insurance through private insurance companies. The alliance issues each enrollee’s health 
security card and reviews consumer information and marketing materials used by the 
health plans to ensure that they meet the standardized criteria. The alliances would also 
function as a clearinghouse: they would collect the health insurance premiums and ensure 
that families with income less than 150 percent of the poverty level received premium 
reductions. Families with income less than 250 percent of the poverty level would qualify 
for a reduction in cost-sharing liabilities, which the regional health alliance would also 
oversee.  
A new National Health Board would be established. Seven members would be 
appointed by the President with Senate confirmation and a chairperson would be selected 
by the President. The National Health Board would be responsible for implementing the 
policies of the HSA. They would define the comprehensive benefit package and would 
recommend future changes of that package. They would also establish the financial 
requirements for health plans and health alliances, determine the risk-adjustment 
 
67 
methodology for reinsurance across health plans, and oversee the development of a 
national health care information system.  
Employers would also have new responsibilities under the HSA. An employer 
would be responsible for paying 80 percent of the premiums for their employees. Large 
employers with over five thousand employees would be able to create their own 
corporate health alliances and contract with health plans in similar ways to regional 
health alliances.   
 Title IV: Medicare and Medicaid 
The HSA proposed major changes public health insurance programs as well. The 
legislation would modify when and how people joined Medicare. People would not be 
eligible for Medicare until after turning 65 and stopping work. Employees who were over 
65 would continue to enroll in the health alliance plans. Upon stopping work, Medicare 
beneficiaries could elect to continue to stay in the alliance plan. The government in this 
case would pay the health alliances 95 percent of expected spending for a comparable 
individual enrolling in regular Medicare coverage. States could also elect to enroll some 
or all their Medicare beneficiaries in the regional health alliances. The federal 
government would pay the states 100 percent of the annual per capita cost for Medicare 
eligible individuals for the costs of their care.  
The HSA would also alter how Medicaid beneficiaries receive their coverage. 
Beneficiaries of Medicaid who did not also receive cash welfare assistance through 
Assistance for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) would enroll in health plans offered by alliances either as an individual or 
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as part of their corporate alliance. Those with incomes less than 150 percent of the federal 
poverty line would be eligible for cost-sharing and premium discounts.  
Medicaid beneficiaries who did receive welfare cash assistance payments through 
AFDC or SSI would also be enrolled in regional health alliances. They would not be 
obligated to pay for premiums14 and would receive a reduction in cost sharing. The 
amount of any copayment (other than hospital emergency room services for which there 
is no emergency medical condition) would be limited to 20 percent of the copayment 
amount otherwise applicable.15 
Title VI: Premium Caps; Premium-Based Financing; and Plan Payments 
Title VI of the HSA described an enforceable cap that would limit the growth of 
insurance premiums and eventually limit premiums from rising faster than the rate of 
inflation. Health insurance companies would submit bids to the regional health alliances 
for offering coverage within the alliance. In each alliance, the average premium across 
plans would need to be lower than the average premium cap calculated by the National 
Health Board.16 If the average premium exceeds the alliance’s premium target, then the 
health plans that proposed excessive premium increases would be required to lower their 
premiums. 
Title VI also specifies the premium shares and possible discounts available for 
individuals and employers. Employers would be responsible for 80 percent of the 
 
14 (§ 6104 p1037) 
15 (§ 1371 p185) 
16 Premium limits would not be uniform across all regional alliances. The legislation 
specifies a process through which changes in demographic factors, socio-economic 
characteristics, and regional price levels would be including in calculating each alliance’s 
premium caps.  
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premium cost for their employees. However, their share would be limited: these 
payments could not go over a specified maximum for the payroll. The largest employers 
would only be responsible for 7.9 percent of their payroll costs. For small employers, the 
share shrinks to a maximum of 3.5 percent of their payroll.  
The legislation also proposed the creation of a committee to recommend policy 
proposals to eliminate the variations in health expenditures across alliances, which were 
not the result of healthcare prices or demographic factors.  
 Title VII: Revenue Provisions 
Financing for the legislation would come from the savings generated from the 
changes to the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Any large employer that established a 
corporate alliance would also be responsible for a surcharge to help finance the system. 
The law would also increase the tobacco excise tax rates.  
Title VIII: Health and Health-Related Programs of the Federal Government 
Title VIII of the HSA allows the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan for 
implementing healthcare reform for military personnel. The Secretary of Defense could 
establish Uniformed Services Health Plans, which would automatically enroll active-duty 
service members. Family members would be able to choose between enrolling in the 
military health plan or a civilian health plan sold on the exchanges. The Uniformed 
Services Health Plans would be allowed to contract with civilian healthcare providers. 
The HSA would also implement changes to the healthcare available to veterans. 
The Secretary of Veterans Affairs (VA) would be required to organize health plans and 
operate VA facilities as or within plans under the HSA. Facilities owned by Veterans 
Affairs could be contracted out as part of other private managed health care plans. The 
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HSA would expand eligibility of VA benefits to all service-connected veterans and their 
dependents. It would also expand the benefits available to these enrollees to include all 
the benefits under the comprehensive benefit package, as well as any benefits previously 
guaranteed to veterans that were not included in the comprehensive health benefit.  
Veterans and their dependents would have options for how to receive their 
benefits. Employed veterans could choose to receive care through their regional or 
corporate health alliance, with the employer paying the employer share and the veteran 
paying the remainder of their premiums and copays. Severely disabled veterans with 
service-related injuries would not be liable for premiums or cost sharing. Veterans could 
also elect to enroll in VA health plans. In this case, the employer would pay the employer 
share to the regional health alliance and veterans would be responsible for ether 
remaining share of the premium as well as copayments.  
The Act would repeal the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. Federal 
would instead enroll in health plans offered in the alliance area where they reside. The 
Indian Health Service would operate outside of the alliance system but would be required 
to offer the comprehensive benefit package specified by the HSA. Individuals eligible to 
enroll in the programs of the Indian Health Service could elect to join a regional health 
plan. Conversely, the legislation would also allow local people who were previously 
ineligible for healthcare from Indian Health Services to receive care from the Indian 
Health Services facilities.  
The HSA and the Neoliberal Capitalist SSA 
Using the defining characteristics of the neoliberal SSA in the early 1990s 
provides a useful lens for analyzing the Clinton administration’s complex healthcare 
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reform. Hacker (2011), Skocpol (1997), and Altman et. al (2011) each comment on the 
unfamiliar approach that the Clinton administration selected for their model of healthcare 
reform. But understood through the lens of SSA theory, the Clinton Health Security Act 
maintained close fidelity to the economic, political, and cultural institutions and dominant 
ideology that underpinned capitalist accumulation in this period. In this era, health policy 
reforms were limited to those that were consistent with the characteristics of the 
neoliberal SSA. These concepts were by no means new or specific to the 1990s. 
However, this change in ideology was one important component of the overall structural 
change that occurred between the regulated capitalist and the neoliberal SSA. 
The HSA’s Neoliberal Underpinnings 
Modifying patient and provider behavior 
The HSA uses three strategies for reforming the healthcare system to a more 
competitive market system. The first strategy focuses on targeting patient and provider 
behavior to make both parties more responsive to market forces. The opening sentences 
of an overview of the HSA from the White House Domestic Policy Council illustrate the 
law’s emphasis on health insurance as a commodity and market competition as the 
appropriate means to allocate this commodity: 
The Health Security Act rejects the idea of a government-run health care 
system. Health care will remain rooted in the private sector. … The 
Health Security Act seeks to build on what works best in the American 
economy and fix what is broken. What works best is a competitive 
market that provides products and services to Americans at the highest 




 Healthcare has characteristics that make market allocation difficult.17 For 
example, using the traditional assumptions regarding consumption and production 
decisions, medical providers are expected to provide too much healthcare. Doctors are 
often paid according to a fee for service (FFS) scheme. In this scenario, the provider is 
paid for every test or intervention that they prescribe. This payment system may motivate 
providers to prescribe more care than what is truly needed, since ordering further exams 
means providing more services, charging more fees, and ultimately earning a higher 
income.  
While these motivations are not exclusive to a healthcare market, in healthcare 
often the provider has a lot more information than their patient on what interventions are 
necessarily and which may be extraneous. Without this same level of information, it is 
possible that an individual may be persuaded to consent to more care than they would 
prefer otherwise. Economists see this additional care, or supplier-induced demand for 
healthcare, as a market inefficiency and loss of welfare.  
Similarly, insured patients are likely to overconsume medical care. When 
individuals have health insurance, they are not liable for some (or all) of their healthcare 
costs. Instead, in exchange for a monthly premium, the health insurance company pays 
some portion (or all) of the healthcare bills. Thus, individuals are shielded from the true 
price of their healthcare. As a result of this distortion, an individual blinded from the 
“true” cost of their healthcare may choose to use more healthcare services than they 
would have otherwise. Insured individuals will act according to the lower insured price of 
 




healthcare instead of the “true” uninsured price of healthcare. This over consumption of 
healthcare resources creates a loss of welfare in society since individuals will be 
consuming healthcare that offers a smaller marginal benefit than its marginal cost.18 
The insurance reforms in the HSA were designed to attenuate these market 
imperfections that commonly arise in healthcare. To motivate patients and providers to 
behave in a cost-conscious manner, Title I of the HSA mandates that all insurers offer a 
specific structure of healthcare plans, often called managed care plans.  
Managed care plans were a predominant feature of a healthcare reform proposal 
published by the Jackson Hole Group, a coalition of academic experts, government 
officials, and business and healthcare executives that began meeting in the 1970s. The 
Clintons were explicit in their use of the Jackson Hole Group’s plan. The White House 
spokesperson for the Health Care Task Force, Bob Boorstin, identified the group as “the 
intellectual brain trust for the managed care model” and credited them with a “very, very 
strong indirect role” in the development of the President’s healthcare plan (Toner 1993). 
Managed care plans merge the insurer and provider roles. Instead of allowing an 
insured individual to select any provider and allow that provider to select any course of 
treatment and set their own prices, managed care plans contract with individual or groups 
of healthcare providers. The healthcare providers and the health insurers selling managed 
care plans would negotiate the details of the payment schemes.  
 
18 This logic is often referred to as a moral hazard argument. When paired with the 
supplier-induced demand argument, they seem to contradict each other. The moral hazard 
argument is based on a consumer’s knowledge of their preferences, while the other 
claims that consumers of health care do not know which tests they need. However, the 
two arguments work in tandem. Even if consumers had all the information about what 
tests were necessary, they would not select the optimal number of tests unless they were 
exposed to the full cost.  
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Under the HSA, each health plan selling in the health alliances would be required 
to offer two health plans with two different payment schemes. Some plans would use a 
fee-for-service payment scheme and pay according to a set of previously agreed on 
prices. Other plans could use a capitation arrangement, in which the insurer pays the 
provider for a specified number of individuals that the provider agrees to treat. Under 
both variations of managed care plans, providers may receive bonuses for providing 
efficient care and/or the providers may agree to additional checks on the services that 
they order for their patients, frequently called utilization reviews. The overconsumption 
of healthcare services would be remedied by requiring individuals to be responsible for a 
share of their care: the legislation mandates that all enrolled individuals pay part of their 
health insurance premium and specify a co-insurance for most medical visits or 
procedures.  
It is worth noting that by the 1990s, many of these principles of managed care 
plans had been tested. These principles had been at the center of the incremental 
healthcare reforms that took place since 1965, such as the Health Maintenance 
Organization Act of 1973. The popularity of managed care plans had skyrocketed 
between the 1970s and the 1990s, yet prices of healthcare continued to grow faster than 
the rate of inflation for consumer goods. The goal of slower healthcare inflation had not 
been achieved after the implementing greater cost-sharing and other measures to make 
physician behavior more cost conscious. Besides the issue of healthcare inflation, the 




Despite the apparent failure in remedying the problems in U.S. healthcare, the 
faith in the discipline of market forces to remedy healthcare problems had not yet abated. 
The dedication to markets as a means of distribution had only strengthened. Alain 
Enthoven, a founding member of the Jackson Hole Group, articulates this in a 1992 
lecture: “Some say, ‘competition failed.’ I say ‘competition has not been tried’” 
(Enthoven 1992). Enthoven defends his arguments concerning the possibility of managed 
care plans to bring competition into the health insurance markets and argues that further 
changes are needed: 
“Competition will not work to provide [health plans] effective incentives 
to cut cost and price unless demand is quite price elastic. Price-inelastic 
demand is not an interchangeable law of nature. It is the consequence of 
many policies pursued by healthcare financing and delivery plans, 
providers, purchasers, and government” (ibid.). 
 
Bringing competition to insurance markets 
The second strategy of the Clinton administration reforms was to make the 
markets for insurance more competitive through the establishment of a network of 
healthcare sponsors. By acting as an informed large collective purchasing agent for health 
insurance, sponsors would be able to solve the problems that the existing health insurance 
market at the individual level had not yet remedied. By only contracting with private 
health insurance plans that used community ratings and accepted every eligible person 
without limits or exclusions for pre-existing conditions, sponsors would establish and 
enforce rules of equity in the market for private health insurance. Insurance plans would 
be unable to cancel an insurance policy before the end of term. Sponsors would also 
simplify the administrative bureaucracies of private insurance plans by being responsible 
for managing enrollment and collecting premiums. The necessary price-elasticity in 
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demand for health insurance by providing information on outcomes and prices, would be 
achieved through sponsors standardizing coverage contracts and by offering a choice of 
plans at the individual level.   
The Clinton administration incorporated this element of the Jackson Hole Group’s 
proposal in the HSA. They referred to the sponsors as regional health alliances (or health 
insurance purchasing cooperatives). As a result of the combined purchasing power of 
sponsors, firms and individuals participating in the alliances would have the bargaining 
power that was only available to large corporations before.   
Shifting public programs into the private sector 
The first two strategies of the HSA focused on creating more competitive markets 
for healthcare and health insurance. The third element of the Clinton health reform 
focused on shifting elements of public health insurance programs into the private sector. 
The Federal Employees Health Benefit Program would be repealed entirely. 
 Changes to Medicaid would dramatically reduce the role of the federal and state 
governments in the provision of the program. Since all Medicaid beneficiaries would be 
enrolled in the regional health alliances, employers would become responsible for 80 
percent of the premium payments for employed beneficiaries. This redistributes a large 
share of the healthcare costs previously paid by state and federal governments to the 
employer. Any Medicaid recipient who did not receive cash payments, such as AFDC or 
SSI, and whose income exceeded 150 percent of the poverty level would become 
individually responsible for their healthcare costs. State governments would continue to 
pay their previous expenditures for these Medicaid recipients to the regional exchanges. 
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The federal government would not make payments to the alliances for this purpose.19 The 
exchanges would then distribute the payments to the health plans (private companies), 
which would in turn pay the providers. 
Only Medicaid recipients who did receive cash payments or whose income did 
not exceed the limit would continue to have their premiums paid publicly and would 
receive reductions in cost sharing. They would not be obligated to pay for premiums and 
would receive a reduction in cost sharing.20 The amount of copayment to any item (other 
than hospital emergency room services for which there is no emergency medical 
condition) would be limited to 20 percent of the copayment amount otherwise 
applicable.21 On behalf of these individuals the Federal and state governments would 
provide payments, equal to 95 percent of their previous spending for AFDC/SSI 
recipients to the state alliances.22 Instead of providers receiving these payments directly 
from the government, the providers would receive their payments from their health plan. 
This reroutes dollars, which would have formerly been paid directly from the government 
to the provider, instead through alliances.  
Similarly, the Clinton Health Security Act also substituted federal spending on 
Medicare payments to employers and private individuals. People would not become 
Medicare eligible after turning 65 but would only be eligible for Medicare after turning 
65 and stopping work. Employers would pay the 80 percent premium share until the 
beneficiary stopped working. After working, Medicare beneficiaries could elect to stay in 
 
19 § 4201 p810 
20 § 6104 p1037 
21 § 1371 p185 
22 § 4201 p809, §9011 p1286 
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their health plan. In this case, the government would pay the health alliances 95 percent 
of what it would have spent on a comparable individual enrolling in regular Medicare 
coverage.23 States could also elect to enroll some or all their Medicare beneficiaries in 
regional health alliances. The federal government would pay the states 100 percent of the 
annual per capita cost for Medicare eligible individuals for the costs of their care, 
rerouting payments originally provided from the Federal government to providers 
through the regional health alliances.  
The ability of veterans to choose whether to receive their HSA benefits through 
the VA or through the alliances would force the VA to compete for enrollees. For the VA 
to be able to compete in the alliances, the VA would be able to contract with private 
facilities. The VA would be transformed into a series of managed care plans. Instead of 
the veterans exclusively receiving care from VA providers paid by the federal 
government, the Veterans Health Administration may contract with private providers to 
offer all the services in the comprehensive benefit package to their enrollees. While the 
VA facilities would remain government owned facilities, they would become open to 
private payers as well as part of other managed healthcare plans. For the VA facilities to 
remain operative, they would rely on private payers. 
The HSA’s Conflicts with Neoliberal Ideas 
The discussion above analyzed how the HSA was designed to preserve and 
strengthen a private model of health insurance and healthcare in the United States. The 
legislation’s three strategies for preserving the private health insurance industry were 
consistent with the institutions and dominant ideology of the neoliberal SSA. However, 
 
23 §§ 4001-4003, p809 
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there are important ways in which aspects of the HSA seemed to counter neoliberal 
ideology. Many criticisms and opponents of the HSA centered on these aspects of reform.  
Price caps and budgeting 
As noted above, the Clinton administration explicitly defined and defended their 
proposal as one “rooted in the private sector” and “rejecting government run healthcare”. 
However, there were some tensions between the administration’s goal and the process 
that the healthcare reform used to achieve the goals. The use of price caps and budgeting 
described in Title VI of the legislation is one such key example. 
The price cap element of the proposal was designed to reverse the trend of rapidly 
increasing healthcare prices. The rapid growth of healthcare prices had two effects that 
the Clinton administration sought to reverse. The rapidly increasing premium rates of 
private health insurers had made buying private health insurance impossible for many 
individuals and businesses. For a private health insurance system to work, individuals 
could not be priced out of the market. The premium price caps were intended as tools to 
maintain the private market.  
Secondly healthcare inflation had important consequences to federal and state 
budgets. The share of public money being spent on the Medicare and Medicaid programs 
had consistently increased. As the share of national and state budgets being spent on 
healthcare costs grew, the private health insurance system became increasingly reliant on 
public funding. By limiting the amount that premiums could initially grow, the HSA 
comported with the Clinton administration’s goal of reducing budget deficits. 
The Clinton administration described their use of premium caps as an “emergency 
brake” and “back-up” measure, written in only in case that the competition and increased 
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efficiency aspects of the healthcare reform did not control costs (Department of 
Commerce and Technology Administration 1993). However, the contradiction between 
price controls and market forces undercut the effectiveness of this argument. The group 
of academics, business owners, and representatives from the healthcare industry that had 
worked on initial Jackson Hole Group proposal, publicly rejected the premium caps as 
incompatible with their model (Ellwood 1993).  
 The employer mandate 
Another feature of the HSA that countered neoliberal ideology was the employer 
mandate. The employer mandate included in the HSA required all employers to pay 80 
percent of their employee’s premium costs, subject to a cap as a percentage of payroll. 
The requirement for employers to help subsidize the costs of private health insurance for 
their employees could be interpreted as an additional tax or regulation on employers. Like 
their arguments for premium caps, the Clinton administration also framed their inclusion 
of the employer mandate as an avenue to maintain the private health insurance system 
using the language of neoliberal ideology: 
“The vast majority of money comes from the same place it comes from 
today: employers and individuals. But under the health security plan, 
every employer and every individual will be asked to contribute to health 
care. Everyone takes responsibility, and everyone gets security.” 
(Department of Commerce and Technology Administration 1993, 28) 
 
At this time during the 1990s, the majority of privately insured people insurance 
received that coverage through their workplace. Having explicitly rejected a 
“government-run” healthcare system, expanding health insurance coverage through 
workplaces was an obvious alternative. Employment-based health insurance was the 
bedrock of the private health insurance system that the Clinton proposal aimed to 
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preserve. The employer mandate was a means for the Clinton administration to reform 
and expand private health insurance coverage. However, to achieve this goal, the 
administration proposed a requirement on all private businesses to help their employees 
purchase insurance.  
 Interest Groups 
The healthcare debate of the 1990s occurred in a much different context than the 
earlier debate on Medicare and Medicaid in the 1960s. The set of institutions and 
dominant ideas of the regulated capitalist SSA, which led to economic crisis in the 1970s, 
were replaced with the neoliberal capitalism’s institutions and ideas. These changes in the 
structure of the economy were reflected in how the group conflict over the HSA played 
out. The conditions of neoliberal capitalism shaped the perceived interests of each group, 
how those interests were articulated, and the success of their strategies.  
Health Insurance Association of America 
The health insurance industry established their major lobbying group, the Health 
Insurance Association of America (HIAA), in 1956. From the outset, the group was 
explicit in their objectives: to establish the insurance model of healthcare in the United 
States and to preserve the role of private industry and block federal involvement. To 
achieve goals, the organization adopted a two-pronged strategy. They aggressively 
promoted the success and growth of the private insurance industry, while attempting to 
avoid a negative public perception as a corporate influencer by lobbying covertly. 
(Chapin 2010) 
In the early 1990s, the organization maintained their aggressive public promotion 
of the success of the private health insurance industry. However, the group seemed less 
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concerned with the need to lobby covertly. The group departed from their usual protocol 
and for the first time released their own proposal for health insurance reform. The 
proposal was covered extensively in public media. Reporters speculated that the move 
indicated a new willingness to work with the administration and compromise their 
previous stance against reform. The front page of the New York Times declared that the 
“Embrace of Universal Insurance Signals Industry’s Resolve to Work with Clinton” (Pear 
1992). The article optimistically describes the announcement as a signal of a “willingness 
to accept sweeping changes.” However G. David Hurd, the chairman-elect of the HIAA 
described the announcement as “certainly not an altruistic act” but an enlightened-self-
interest” (Stout and Steinmetz 1992). The chairman confirmed: 
“There is a general recognition within the industry that we had an image 
problem and needed to address it. The desire to be regarded more 
favorably by the public has led to a lot more receptivity to change. We 
recognize … that the defense of the status quo is just not a viable 
strategy” (qtd. in Pear 1992). 
 
His comments suggest that in the early 1990s, at the height of neoliberal 
capitalism and its attendant praise of market allocation, the organization no longer 
believed publicly discussing healthcare reform proposals were strategic error. Instead, the 
organization adjusted their strategy and became a public and active participant in 
healthcare reform. The HIAA’s vision for reform called for universal coverage, a 
requirement for employers to offer a benefit package, cost containment measures, and a 
tax on employees who were insured beyond the basic benefit package.24 
 
24 This tax is commonly referred to as the “Cadillac Tax.”  
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 The organization did not shy away from public discussion of healthcare 
reform in the months following President Clinton’s inauguration and his promise to 
deliver comprehensive healthcare reform. However, the HIAA did experience a major 
change in their membership. By January 1993, four of the largest insurance companies 
CIGNA, Aetna, Travelers, and MetLife had defected from the group (Brostoff 1993). 
CIGNA cited a need to “eliminate all but ‘absolutely essential expenses’” for their 
departure. Aetna and MetLife explained their interest in forming broader coalitions for 
healthcare reform as the reason for the withdrawal. (Hoffman 1992) 
Under the new leadership of former Representative A. Willis “Bill” Gradison, and 
without their largest companies, the organization continued to publicly promote 
themselves as proponents of comprehensive reform. At the initial White House Task 
Force public hearing on March 23, Gradison repeated the organization’s belief “that our 
industry must change the way we do business” and continued to tout the principles for 
reform the group released the previous year. He was careful to specify the organization’s 
explicit rejection of the limits on insurance premiums and the use of strict community 
ratings, two elements of the HSA with close relation to how health insurers do business.  
In the build up to the Clinton administration’s announcement of the HSA, the 
HIAA continued publicly representing themselves as leaders in reform efforts. On behalf 
of the HIAA, Chairman David Hurd testified to Congress: 
“The Health Insurance Association has been actively working on reform 
beginning in 1990. We constructed a set of initiatives to be enacted at 
the State level and those have progressed so that now 40 States have 




However, later remarks from Gradison revealed that the HIAA’s public 
statements were part of a strategy of blocking reform, not signals of the group’s 
“willingness to accept significant changes,” as the New York Times had previously 
speculated (Pear 1992). In a keynote address, Gradison commented that: 
“From a political point of view, you can vote against another plan and 
convince your constituents that you want something done about 
healthcare reform as long as you have a plan you are for” (Gradison 
1993). 
 
In the same address, Gradison also suggested that the organization’s public 
dedication to state level reforms, which helped the HIAA credibly say that it was working 
towards reform, was a means to obstruct national healthcare reform: 
“… the states are not waiting [to enact healthcare reform]. Maryland has 
acted in a major way, and so has Florida. It will be more difficult, not 
less, to come up with a national plan … The more states devise their own 
plans, the more general the federal plan will have to be, or it will cause 
real confrontation” (Gradison 1993). 
 
In the context of the new phase of capitalism, the HIAA no longer felt that their 
public reputation would be best managed by remaining on the sidelines of the healthcare 
debate. The new dominance of market forces over state allocation allowed the insurers 
the possibility of publicly participating in the debate. The used that opportunity to 
cultivate an image of an industry working to reform itself. Such an outcome was not 
considered impossible. On the contrary, the dominant neoliberal ideology supported the 
claim that private businesses that did not adjust to meet public needs would go out of 
business.  
There was a third element of the HIAA’s strategy to fight healthcare reform in the 
1990s. While the insurers ran a public campaign cultivating an image of supporting 
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aspects of reform, the insurers simultaneously offered subtle criticisms of the reform. 
They subtly but publicly prompted doubt in the government’s capability to enact reform. 
A November 1993 press release issued by HIAA Executive Vice President Charles N. 
Kahn III demonstrates how the insurers walked this line: 
“HIAA is foursquare in favor of comprehensive reform of the healthcare 
system. We agree that all Americans should have health coverage – 
coverage that they can get, keep, and take with them wherever they go. 
We want Congress to act on healthcare reform and meet the President’s 
objective before the end of the next year. But we have raised and will 
continue to raise questions about the President’s plan – questions that the 
American public need answer. In particular, we wish to take the 
President at his word that he wants a reformed health care system based 
upon a private/public partnership. However we find it difficult to see 
how this partnership can work with mandatory government-run alliances 
…”. 
 
However, the organization did simultaneously take some efforts to distance 
themselves from active criticisms. The HIAA relayed many of their efforts to build doubt 
on the reform events through the Coalition for Health Insurance Choices (CHIC), an 
organization funded by the HIAA. Documents released by Families USA, a consumer 
group supporting reform, revealed that coalition members were given a monthly list of 
tasks and resources to impede health reform’s success. For example, CHIC members 
were given sample scripts for speeches, for letters, and for editorial pages, which each 
presented the HIAA’s view on reforms, along with instructions to “act like regular folks 
when giving it.” (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1993) 
CHIC also bankrolled a television advertisement campaign to continue stoking 
doubt over the potential for healthcare reform. The series of ads featured a middle-class 
middle-aged couple discussing the details of healthcare reform at their kitchen table. 
Repeating the HIAA’s views, the characters express their support for comprehensive 
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insurance reform, but with reservations on provisions such as the premium caps and 
mandatory alliances. In one version of the advertisement, the couple discusses healthcare 
reform over breakfast:25 
Harry:   I’m glad the President’s doing something about health care reform. 
Louise:  He’s right. We need it. 
Harry:   Some of these details. 
Louise: Like a national limit on health care? 
Harry:   Really. 
Louise:  The Government caps how much the country can spend on all 
health care and says, “That’s it!” 
Harry:  So what if our health plan runs out of money? 
Louise:  There’s got to be a better way.  
 
Another version of the ad features Harry and Louise discussing their future 
choices over health insurance plans: 
Harry:   (kissing Louise) Find more you like in the president’s health plan? 
Louise:  (reading the President’s Health Security Plan) Yeah. 
Harry:   And? 
Louise: (showing Harry the book) Well, it just doesn’t have the choice we 
want. Look at this – [chyron: President’s Plan Page 66] the 
government picks health plans, then we have to pick a plan from 
their list. That’s the choice we get. 
Harry:   (taking the book): What if we don’t like their choices? 
Louise:  (throwing book on table): If it’s not on their list … 
Harry:   (folding his arms on his chest): There’s got to be a better way.   
  (White House Health Care Task Force and Walter Zelman). 
 
It is worth noting that neither Harry nor Louise, nor the narrator at the end of the 
scene, who encourages viewers to call their Congressional representatives, specifies any 
alternative plan for reform.  
The arguments struck central to the importance in the neoliberal era of individual 
choice, responsibility, and fear of government. None of these arguments were new to the 
 
25 The characters in the advertisements were unnamed, however, they have become 
known by the first names of the actors playing them, Harry and Louise.   
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public debate over healthcare reform. They were features of all the previous discussions 
over Medicare and Medicaid. However, Harry and Louise’s conversations are considered 
among the most persuasive arguments against healthcare reform in the neoliberal era. 
Senator Rockefeller described the ads as “the single most destructive campaign I’ve seen 
in 30 years” (qtd. in The Center for Public Integrity 1994, 8). An investigation by the 
Center for Public Integrity credited them as “almost single-handedly responsible” for a 
20-point drop in public opinion regarding the Clinton healthcare reform plans (p. 8). The 
arguments were not unique in history but uniquely provocative in the early 1990s.  
Although the HIAA purchased no national ad time, the ads gained national 
attention after eliciting responses from the Clintons. In a speech to a group of 
pediatricians, Hillary Clinton responded: 
“They [private insurers] like being able to exclude people from coverage 
because the more they can exclude, the more money they can make. Now 
they have the gall to run TV ads that there is a better way, the very 
industry that has brought us to the brink of bankruptcy because of the 
way they have financed health care” (Clymer 1993). 
 
 In the same speech she said: 
 
“It is time for … every American to stand up and say to the insurance 
industry, ‘Enough is enough. We want our health care system back’” 
(Clymer 1993).  
 
The comments were printed on the first pages of The Washington Post and The 
New York Times the following day, igniting national news coverage of the 
advertisements. Besides adding more publicity to the HIAA’s television advertisements, 
the First Lady’s comments backfired in another crucial way in the neoliberal era. Her 
comments were further marshaled as evidence that Health Security Act was not a means 
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to reduce the government budget deficit, spur economic growth, and ensure universal 
coverage for Americans. Opponents of reform used her public comments railing against 
private insurance and calling them liars as unmasking the HSA’s identity as a means for a 
“government run healthcare plan”. 
The contradictory strategy of the Clinton administration to simultaneously 
recommend a health insurance reform based on expanding private health insurance while 
also publicly condemning the industry was unsuccessful. The inconsistency highlights the 
conflicting institutions of the neoliberal era. After having adhered to the economic logic 
that private markets are the socially optimal means of allocation, the Clinton 
administration’s attempts to establish the reforms as the means to perfect market 
allocation were ineffective. Hillary Clinton demonstrated the contradictions in remarks 
she delivered to a group of healthcare professionals in Philadelphia:  
“You know, the vast majority [of waste] comes from the private sector 
… It’s also rife with fraud, waste, and abuse. What we’re really trying to 
do is build on the private sector. This is not a government run healthcare 
plan” (Priest, 1994). 
 
The specific conditions of capitalist accumulation altered the lobbying strategy of 
health insurance companies. Market forces, as opposed to the state or unions, were 
thought of as the optimal means for allocation. The HSA proposal accordingly held an 
important role for private insurers. In these conditions, the HIAA conducted a very public 
but subtle attack against the Clinton HSA, a reform that was less statist than the Medicare 
proposal that they faced thirty years earlier. Their attacks were not unique but were 
enormously effective in the neoliberal era. 
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The Business Roundtable 
Early support 
The new structural changes in the U.S. economy also affected how big business 
groups participated in reform. Like the insurance companies, big business groups were 
not active participants in discussions of healthcare reform under the Johnson 
administration. In discussions of healthcare reform in the 1990s, however, big business 
groups played an extremely important role. As the neoliberal SSA emerged from the 
crisis of regulated capitalism, big business owners had gained a tremendous amount of 
lobbying power and became actively involved in shaping the state. In the new climate, 
legislation was thought unlikely to pass without capitalist support. The Clinton 
administration accordingly was persistent in their efforts to work with big business 
groups and offer a proposal for healthcare reform that would be amenable to their 
interests. 
One such important group lobbied by the Clinton administration was the Business 
Roundtable. The organization, formed in 1972, had a membership of the chief executive 
officers (CEOs) of large U.S. corporations. The group created a Business Roundtable 
Task Force on Health, Welfare, and Retirement Income in 1985. During the early years 
of the Clinton administration Robert Winters, the CEO of Prudential Insurance Company, 
chaired the taskforce. 
 Because of the growing expenses that employers paid for health insurance, it was 
widely expected that significant reform would pass with the support of big businesses. 
The Business Roundtable confirmed these suspicions in February of 1993, when the 
organization released a one-page position statement urging the White House Task Force 
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to act to address the healthcare system’s “need of significant structural reform”. The 
Roundtable also specified suggestions for the redesign, including a standardized set of 
benefits, promotion of managed care plans, income-based subsidies, and group 
purchasing arrangements to assist small groups and individuals with purchasing private 
health insurance. (“Health Care - HRC Transcripts” 1993) 
Records from the First Lady’s Office and the records of the Health Care Task 
Force indicate that between the February public statement and President Clinton’s 
Congressional address on September 22 of that year, members of the Business 
Roundtable met with the Clinton administration (Ira Magaziner, a Senior Advisor to the 
President, Hilary Clinton, or the President himself) officials on four occasions. There is 
significant evidence that aspects of the HSA were explicitly created to meet the Business 
Roundtable’s requests. During remarks to the organization, Ms. Clinton outlined major 
elements of the reform, then adds: 
“…if they sound familiar to some of you, they should. They were the 
nine parts of the Business Roundtable goals for health care reform that 
were adopted in February of this year. And they, along with the work of 
a number of other organizations, both in public and private sectors, have 
served as the basis for the efforts that we have undertaken”. (“Health 
Care - HRC Transcripts” 1993) 
 
Her remarks close with additional emphasis on the administration’s desires to 
work with members of the Business Roundtable and requests for their specific goals for 
healthcare reform: 
“We particularly think [our proposal] is good for big business … we want 
you to be our partners and we want you to support this, and we need your 




Evaluations of the HSA by consultants supported Clinton’s claims. One such 
study, by A. Foster Higgins & Co. Inc., examined the potential effects on the benefit plan 
costs of four companies of varied sizes, with between 1,200 and 14,500 employees 
nationwide. Their study concluded that the largest employers would each save over $2 
million in benefit costs within the first year of the HSA’s enactment and cumulatively 
over $50 million over ten years by joining the regional purchasing alliances. The smaller 
companies, including a hotel operator that offered only limited benefits to its employees, 
were also projected to save over $250,000 within the first year and $1 million over ten 
years (Mandelker & Findlay, 1994).  Firms also conducted their own internal projections 
of the proposed healthcare reform. Union Pacific’s estimates found that healthcare reform 
would save them millions annually (Judis, 1994).  
Retracted support 
Despite the advantages to reform in the healthcare industry and the persistent 
efforts of the Clinton administration to work with big business groups like the Business 
Roundtable, ultimately the influential group of business executives distanced themselves 
from the Clinton reform. According to Mike Lux, the special assistant to President 
Clinton for the Office of Public Liaison, General Electric CEO Jack Welch also expected 
that healthcare reform would save him millions, but that fact did nothing to sway his 
position towards reform. Lux recalls Welch as saying, “I don’t care [about the savings] 
… I can’t support it because this is socialism” (qtd. in Corrado 2004, 16).  
Saving millions of dollars on their healthcare costs was not a compelling enough 
reason for CEOs of large companies to support healthcare reform. The neoliberal SSA 
had ushered in a period of long economic expansion, which was extremely beneficial for 
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U.S. companies.26 Big business executives also enjoyed privileges of growing political 
strength.  
The Clinton administration at times tried to warn big business about the 
consequence of the failure of their market-based health care reform, suggesting that if 
comprehensive healthcare reform was not achieved in the near future, that pressure for a 
more interventionist state-run plan might arise. In a speech at the Business Roundtable 
that Hillary Clinton gave to gather support for the Clinton Health Plan, the First Lady 
argues that:   
“…if we do not move in the next year to deal with this, or if we only 
make marginal, tinkering changes, then I think the status quo will not 
remain in place; it will deteriorate. It will be a very much more difficult 
task to take on, and the political pressure will build for the single-payer 
government solution, because people will be fed up and frustrated.  The 
more layoffs, the more aggregations of contracts, the more employers 
pulling out, the more political pressure there will be” (First Lady’s 
Office, First Lady’s Press Office, and Lisa Caputo 1993).  
 
Clinton suggests that constituents will become increasingly frustrated with the 
existing healthcare system. However, her effort to threaten big business with the specter 
of more radical health care reform was not a plausible threat in that period. Big business 
had no obvious competition from groups with opposing goals, and there was no 
indication that other groups, such as labor or consumers were likely to gain enough 
strength so as to influence reforms that could pass without big business input.  
Despite the increasing healthcare costs and number of uninsured individuals, 
business leaders did not fear negative repercussions for maintaining the status quo. In 
February 1994, the Roundtable endorsed a competing and more limited healthcare reform 
 
26 See (Kotz 2015) 
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bill, sponsored by Rep. Cooper.27 The reform bill was often referred to as “Clinton-lite.” 
Only businesses with fewer than 100 employees would be mandated to participate in the 
alliances and all employers would have to offer, but not pay for, health insurance in an 
alliance. Despite the endorsement, the Roundtable took no actions to ensure the passage 
of any piece of legislation.  
The 1990s were characterized by mounting problems in U.S. healthcare and a 
simultaneous period of political will and public desire for healthcare reform. However, 
the institutions and dominant ideas of the neoliberal SSA were well entrenched. These 
institutions jointly created unfavorable conditions to healthcare reform. The diminished 
power of citizen and labor groups in this period relieved big business organizations of the 
pressures to go along with major political changes -- even when the changes would be 
beneficial to them. 
Small Businesses 
Like the large business owners, small business owners ostensibly stood to benefit 
from healthcare reform. Small businesses typically face smaller profit margins and fierce 
competition, two factors that make it difficult for them to absorb shocks such as 
healthcare costs. Indeed, rising healthcare costs were often identified as the “single 
biggest problem in 1992” for small business owners (Greco, 1992). Offering 
employment-based health insurance could help small business owners recruit and retain 
the best employees. Small businesses that sponsored health insurance coverage for their 
employees, as around 60 percent of small business owners with less than 500 employees 
did, would benefit from lower healthcare costs (Saddler 1993).  
 
27 H.R. 3222/S. 1579  
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Small businesses typically faced higher premium prices for health insurance than 
large business did. National Small Business United, estimated that the premium costs 
were 40 percent higher and that they grew 50 percent faster compared to larger 
businesses (National Small Business United 1993). According to the National Federation 
for Independent Businesses, the faster rates of healthcare inflation for small businesses 
led to increases of “30 percent to 300 percent annually” of their premiums annually 
(Walker 1992). Without a larger group of enrollees, small businesses were at a 
disadvantage in negotiating insurance plan, or had their pre-existing conditions excluded 
from the health plan. (National Small Business United 1993) 
Besides lowering their overall costs for healthcare and expanding their workers’ 
access to healthcare, the HSA also included limits on how much an employer could spend 
on their premiums. Even the maximum amount, intended for the largest businesses with 
the highest wages, would have their premium costs capped at 7.9 percent of their payroll. 
The HSA originally included a maximum 3.5 percent cap for the smallest businesses. 
Variations of reform bills considered at the same time would have cut the cut to just one 
percent of payroll for the smallest businesses (Spencer 1994).  As a point of comparison, 
the National Federation of Independent Businesses estimated that their members were 
“spending anywhere from 11 percent to 24 percent of payroll on health insurance 
premiums and co-payments” (Walker 1992). 
Despite the potential advantages for their bottom-line, many small business 
organizations maintained their strong opposition to reform, as they did in the 1960s. 
Lobbyists promised their usual predictions: job loss, lost wages, and slow economic 
growth would result from any employer mandate to pay for their workers’ insurance. The 
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same would be true of any increased payroll tax to help finance public insurance for 
unemployed workers. A representative from the National Restaurant Association, who 
described his organization as “dominated by small businesses” with “extremely slim 
profit margins,” testified that 
“We are not engaging in hyperbole when we say that mandated 
employer-provided coverage or higher payroll taxes to pay for health 
benefits would literally sound the death knell for thousands of restaurants 
– and discourage thousands of other restaurants from ever opening up” 
(Clinton Presidential Records 1993) 
 
In defense of their opposition to the employer-mandate, representatives from 
small businesses relied on the language of the neoliberal SSA. The representative from 
the National Restaurant Association described himself as “paranoid” about the possibility 
of the employer mandate, saying “If I give up an inch, I am terribly concerned about that 
inch” (ibid.). The executive vice president of National Small Business United described 
an “ideal” system of health insurance as companies purchasing insurance for catastrophic 
illnesses 
 “with individual employees paying for basic preventative care and 
whatever other medical treatment they choose to buy” (emphasis added). 
 
He continued discussing health insurance reform in the context of a consumer’s 
“choice” to buy healthcare. He went on to predict that insured workers “are going to go 
out and create that expense simply because it’s available to them” (Caspar 1990). These 
arguments reflect the market-centric and highly individualistic institutions and ideas of 
the neoliberal SSA.  
Representatives from the National Federation of Independent Businesses also 
maintained a fierce opposition to healthcare reform, particularly the employer mandate. 
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The organization even refused an invitation to appear the White House Task Force’s 
initial public hearing in February of 1993. The organization’s chief lobbyist, John 
Motley, described his organization’s “early strategic decisions” to “play on public fears 
that jobs would be lost if employers had to absorb added insurance costs” (Clymer, Pear, 
and Toner 1994). In January, the National Federation of Independent Businesses and the 
National Restaurant Association publicly supported the Cooper legislation. Like their big 
business counterparts, members of the organization recognized the potential savings of 
more significant reforms: 
“I don’t care what the subsidy scheme is. This is the government taking 
total and complete control.”  (Wartzman and Saddler 1994) 
 
Other small business organizations, such as the Chamber of Commerce and the 
National Association for Manufacturers, took a softer stance to healthcare reform and 
initially. Both organizations expressed qualified support for an employer mandate, but 
later publicly changed their mind. In one interesting example, a prepared statement from 
the Chamber of Commerce, which supported an employer mandate with employers 
paying a maximum of 50 percent of the premium cost, was submitted to a Congressional 
committee ahead of a hearing in February 1994. However, at the hearing, the Chamber of 
Commerce representative testified in opposition of the HSA and “any of the mandate 
proposals” (qtd. in Mathis 1994). He later renounced the advance statement and claimed 
not have never reviewed it (ibid.). Shortly after the Chamber’s announcement, the 
National Association for Manufacturers also announced they could not support the 
Clinton healthcare plan (Uchitelle 1994). 
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Later reports indicated that a Republican Representative, John A. Boehner, had 
accused the Chamber of Commerce of “sell[ing] out its members for 30 pieces of silver” 
and had influenced the organization’s decision to oppose the healthcare bill (Priest 1994). 
A mid-Western telecommunications company, Ameritech, was similarly admonished by 
Republican politicians after publicly supporting employer mandates (Weisskopf 1994). A 
letter signed by the Minority Leader and Minority Whip expressed “strong displeasure” 
with the endorsement and referenced current telecommunications legislation: 
“From our recent discussions with you on telecommunications 
legislation, we were under the impression that you believed that 
government hindered competitiveness and true competition. Thus your 
support for a proposal that will result in a tremendous burden on 
American business is surprising”  (qtd. in ibid.). 
 
By April, the Chamber of Commerce was repeating the arguments of the National 
Federation for Independent Businesses and the National Restaurant Association. The 
chamber stated that universal coverage was no longer a policy goal for the organization 
and that “consumers should pay a larger portion of the cost … to discourage unnecessary 
utilization” (Pearlstein 1994; Priest 1994).  
Small business groups stuck to their previous arguments against healthcare reform 
in the 1990s, as they did in the 1960s. In many cases, business owners predicted reform 
would benefit them from financially. However, the threat of government intervention is 
heightened for small businesses, who assume that they will have little control over the 
way that the strengthened state will intervene. is than for large businesses. This threat 
may have carried extra weight in this context with indications from Republican party 
members that support for significant healthcare reform would be interpreted by 
Republican party members as a show of support for greater regulation and a rejection of 
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market principles. Ultimately small business groups did not support reforms and repeated 
the usual refrains of the negative consequences of any reform: government takeovers, lost 
jobs, and limited freedoms. These arguments were especially effective in the neoliberal 
SSA, especially when big business groups such as the Business Roundtable echoed their 
concerns. 
Labor and Citizen Groups 
Long before the healthcare debate emerged in the early 1990s, the limited capital-
labor accord of the previous SSA had been replaced by a partnership between big and 
small businesses. Kotz (2015) provides evidence of the joint effort that owners of small 
and large businesses to establish the neoliberal capitalist SSA. The celebration of market 
allocation, a key feature of the new set of institutions and ideas under neoliberal 
capitalism, had weakened the strength and power of unions and collective bargaining 
agreements. In the previous SSA, labor and citizen groups successfully pushed for the 
expansion of the public welfare state. Although labor and citizen groups continued to 
support healthcare reform in the neoliberal period, their arguments were ineffective. The 
institutions and ideas of the new SSA had undermined these group’s positions, their 
arguments, and their ability to effectively organize. 
Many labor groups supported a single-payer healthcare reform or an expansion of 
the public Medicare programs. These proposals also had significant popular support. A 
survey conducted by CBS News and the New York Times found that 56 percent of U.S. 
adults surveyed favored a tax financed national health insurance system in 1990 (CBS 
News/New York Times, 1990). Each of these policy proposals, which were more 
compatible with the institutions and ideas of the regulated capitalist SSA, were 
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summarily dismissed by policymakers. In a May 1993 memo Mike Lux, a Special 
Assistant to the President, states: “… the single-payer no deductible/co-pay position in 
my view is absurd…” (Lux 1993). Other reports from those close to the Clinton 
administration revealed single-payer style health insurance reform was never seen as a 
realistic option (The Center for Public Integrity 1994). 
Perhaps the most public exhibit of the dismissal of single-payer advocates 
occurred in a October 1993 Ways and Means Committee hearing. Following testimony 
supporting a single-payer system from the policy manager from Consumers Union, the 
nonprofit organization that publishes Consumer Reports, Representative Thomas replied 
that  
“But if you want to hang on the position … you are not going to be a 
player in this initial round of trying to determine how we change the 
health care system. And if that is going to be your position, fine. Then I 
understand and how I need to deal with you. That is, you’re not going to 
be a player” (Subcommittee on Health 1993a, 279). 
 
The dismissal of the single-payer option, despite the significant public and labor 
support, speaks to the strength and cohesion of the institutions and ideas of the neoliberal 
SSA.  
The minimal attention given by the administration to a single-payer system did 
not launch labor and citizen groups into a united campaign against the Clinton HSA.28 
Some groups, such as the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers union, maintained strict 
support for single-payer reforms and could not support the HSA. Other organizations, 
like the AFL-CIO, SEIU, Families USA, and Citizen Action, offered support of the 
 
28 For more detailed accounts of the single-payer versus HSA debate in the left, see 
(Klein 2003; Gottschalk 2000; Lenz 2010).  
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Clinton health plan. Their members’ testimonies in support of the Clinton HSA often 
mentioned a preference for a single-payer style system.29 
However, even these organizations’ arguments in support of the HSA were 
ineffective in the neoliberal SSA. As noted by Gottschalk (2000), labor’s simultaneous 
campaign against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) disrupted their 
support of healthcare reform. Some legislators implied that their opposition to NAFTA 
rendered to their arguments in favor of healthcare less compelling. For instance, John J. 
Sweeney, testifying on behalf of the AFL-CIO’s support of healthcare reform was asked,  
“Would you please explain to me why your organization supports a plan 
which will raise the costs to 80 percent of employers in the United States 
and arguing that, in fact, it will produce jobs when you are opposing the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, when the economy of Mexico 
is 4.5 percent of the United States—smaller than the State of Illinois—
but argue that NAFTA is going to lose hundreds of thousands of jobs 
over the same period?” (Subcommittee on Health 1993b, 28) 
 
The strength of the institutions and the dominant ideas of the neoliberal SSA 
rendered the preferred healthcare reform approach of organized labor and citizen groups 
to be considered unviable in this period – despite the significant public support for such a 
system. In this context healthcare reform was limited to approaches that relied on private 
market institutions and business support. Organized labor, already embattled in trade 
policy negotiations, offered qualified support of the Clinton HSA. The organizations also 
consistently opposed many legislative alternatives to the HSA, like the Cooper legislation 
supported by business groups. Yet their positions did little to sway big business 
 
29 For a few examples, see the testimony of Ms. Shearer, Mr. Kirsch, Mr. Dornon, and 
Ms. Porter in (Subcommittee on Health 1993a). 
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executives, who had abandoned the prior capital-labor accord to work with small 
business owners.  
Conclusion 
Histories of the demise of the Clinton health plan are ubiquitous.30 They 
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the administration’s communication strategies, 
outreach, and the personal political struggles of the administration. The above discussion 
deepens our understanding of the reasons for a failure of this major attempt at healthcare 
reform. Belief in unregulated markets and a distrust of the government has not been a 
consistent feature of American culture that can be held responsible for cases of health 
reform’s failure. However, these ideas were compatible with the dominant ideology of 
the neoliberal SSA. As such, the Clinton administration crafted and marketed their 
healthcare reforms centering on the virtues of markets and individual responsibility. The 
expected that appealing to business’s bottom lines would gain support from the business 
owners.  
However, the crisis of regulated capitalism in the early 1970s catalyzed business 
leaders to abandon their previous alliance with labor and instead join with small business 
owners. The complex set of mutually reinforcing institutions and beliefs that capitalist 
accumulation requires shifted the attitudes of interest groups towards social programs. In 
the heyday of neoliberal capitalism, neither big business executives or small business 
owners could be persuaded to support significant healthcare reform. The health insurance 
industry’s lobby, no longer limited by the public’s lack of tolerance for the interference 
 
30 See, for instance: (Altman and Schactman 2011; Clymer, Pear, and Toner 1994; 
Corrado 2003; Gottschalk 2000; Hacker 1997; Johnson and Broder 1997; Judis 1994; 
Lenz 2010; Quadagno 2006; Skocpol 1997; Starr 2011) 
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of corporations in politics, launched an extremely public campaign against healthcare 
reform. Labor and citizen groups, which played an important role in the success of 
Medicare and Medicaid, felt limited in the reforms they could support and had their 
positions undermined by their weakening economic power. The analysis of this chapter 
draws attention to the importance that the conditions of capitalism in each period has on 




CHAPTER 6   
CASE STUDY: THE PASSAGE OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010 
 
Introduction 
Fifteen years after the rejection of the Health Security Act, President Obama 
signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), a law that altered the 
financing, structure, and delivery of healthcare in the United States. Many accounts of the 
law’s passage attribute the Obama administration’s success after the failure of the HSA to 
the President’s superior adeptness as a politician. Stuart Altman, a member of the health 
policy team for the Obama administration, and Paul Starr, senior advisor to President 
Clinton on healthcare policy, both document how the Obama administration intentionally 
developed their healthcare policy strategy as the antithesis of Clinton administration’s 
strategy (Altman and Schactman 2011; Starr 2011). Brill (2015) focuses on the 
compromises the Obama administration worked out with industry stakeholders and 
interest groups that facilitated the law’s passage. Skocpol and Jacobs (2010) offer a more 
historical analysis. They highlight the role that increasing economic inequalities played in 
the law’s success. In this case study, I explore how a change in the phase of the neoliberal 
SSA created institutional conditions that were favorable for passage of the Obama 
administration’s healthcare reform.  
This chapter is organized as follows. First, I return to a brief discussion of SSA 
theory to situate the events of 2008 within the SSA framework. I offer evidence of the 
changing and unstable dynamics of capitalism. Next, I analyze the ways in which the 
changing economic conditions and destabilization of neoliberal institutions and ideas are 
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reflected in the content and structure of the major proposals for healthcare reform. This 
discussion specifically examines the ways in which the ACA defies the trends of the 
neoliberal era. I then present evidence of major stakeholder’s support for or opposition to 
the legislation and consider the ways in which the SSA shaped their interests both the 
effectiveness of their arguments. 
The Neoliberal SSA in the Crisis Phase 
The previous case study examined healthcare reform in the consolidation phase of 
the neoliberal SSA, in which a coherent set of institutions and ideas that sustains 
capitalist accumulation develops and becomes further entrenched in society. This case 
study examines healthcare reform in the second phase of the neoliberal SSA, in which the 
contradictions of the joint set of institutions emerge and obstruct capitalist accumulation.  
Identifying a Crisis 
Identifying an exact starting or end point for each phase of an SSA is difficult. 
Changes do not occur at the same pace across all institutions or within all industries. For 
the purposes of this case study, we will consider the financial crisis and global recession 
that emerged in the fall of 2008 as a manifestation of the destabilization of the institutions 
of neoliberal capitalism. The analysis of Kotz (2015 ch. 4, 5), supports this interpretation. 
I draw from that analysis of the ways in which the institutions of neoliberal capitalism 
promoted decades of stable economic growth before creating the conditions which led to 
the global financial crisis.   
The financial crisis caused immediate economic instability. In the fall of 2008, 
Merrill Lynch was sold, Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, and the American Insurance 
Group and several of the largest banks were bailed out with public funds. The global 
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crisis catalyzed a remarkable response from U.S. policymakers that moved beyond the 
previous constraints of neoliberal capitalism. Keynesian ideology was resurrected, and 
the government took a strong role in stabilizing the financial markets.  
On October 3 of 2008, the U.S. Congress authorized 700 billion dollars 
investment in purchasing toxic financial assets from struggling financial institutions. A 
few weeks later, CEOs of the nine largest financial companies all accepted a government 
bailout and acquiesced to a government stake in their companies. The American 
Reinvestment and Recovery Act was signed in February of 2009, injecting 787 billion 
dollars into the U.S. economy through government spending as well as cutting taxes. 
These massive interventions by the federal government became a frequent topic in 
popular discourse, alongside poor conditions in the U.S. labor market and an increasing 
number of foreclosures. Concerns and doubts of the capitalist economic system were 
printed in mainstream media outlets. For example, an October 10 Washington Post 
headline, titled “The End of American Capitalism,” asserted that “The worst financial 
crisis since the Great Depression is claiming another casualty: American-style 
capitalism” (Faiola 2008). The Guardian described “How the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers pushed Capitalism to the Brink” (Clark 2009). The Financial Times initiated a 
series titled “The Future of Capitalism.” The journal’s chief economics editor, Martin 
Wolf, opens the first installment of the series with a remarkable description of the fall of 
neoliberal capitalism:  
Another ideological god has failed. The assumptions that ruled policy 
and politics over three decades suddenly look as outdated as 




Former Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan confirmed the failure of neoliberal 
ideology. Greenspan, a well-known acolyte for market principles, testified at 
Congressional hearings on the causes of the financial crisis. When facing questions about 
how he had contributed to the crisis as the preceding Fed Chairman, Greenspan explained 
that he had found a “fatal flaw” in his previously held ideology (Andrews 2008).  
The flawed ideology that Greenspan was referencing was the efficiency of 
unregulated markets. The logic of the market underpins the entire neoliberal social 
structure of accumulation. Without the belief that unregulated markets are the best way to 
serve the societal interest, the arguments that promoted the major economic 
developments over the last thirty years had no basis. Greenspan’s questioning of the 
economic canon contributed to the discrediting of the logic of neoliberalism. 
Outside of the headlines of major mainstream newspapers and Congressional 
hearings, there were other indications of a changing public sentiment. Surveys by the 
Pew Research Center in 2009 described Americans as “increasingly skeptical about the 
power and profits of large companies and business corporations” (Pew Research Center 
2008). This rapidly changing economic landscape, and the resulting discredting of the 
previously dominant ideas, had important implications for this period’s attempt at 
healthcare reform. It was in the wake of the financial crisis and Great Recession that the 





The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
Over one-thousand pages long, the full scope of the ACA31 reaches nearly every 
aspect of healthcare delivery and finance in the United States. This case study does not 
attempt a comprehensive discussion of all provisions of the bill.  Instead, the analysis 
highlights the aspects of the law which were particularly relevant to the groups 
considered in these case studies: health insurers, employers, and labor and citizen 
groups.32 There are three titles of the ACA that are most relevant for these stakeholders: 
Titles I, II, and IX. I briefly summarize some important aspects of each of these titles 
below. 
Title I: Quality and Affordable Health Care for All Americans 
The first title of the law mandates important changes in the private health 
insurance industry. Subtitles A, B, and C specify new regulations for the insurance 
industry: what kind of insurance is sold, who it is sold to, and how the insurance plans are 
sold. Health plans must fully cover, without any cost sharing, a set of federally mandated 
benefits including those recommended by the U.S. Preventative Services Task Force. 
Insurance coverage must be guaranteed: exclusions for pre-existing conditions are 
forbidden, as is any discrimination in issuing insurance based on health status. Only once 
 
31 Unless otherwise stated, when I refer to the ACA I am specifically referencing the nine 
titles of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590) as amended by the 
one title of the Reconciliation Bill (H.R. 4872). 
32 As can be expected in a bicameral legislature, there were several iterations of 
healthcare proposals considered in Congress between January 2009 and March 2010. 
Lawsuits following the law’s enactment have also changed the law significantly. The 
variations of the bill that were considered at different stages and its variations since 
enactment are detailed in other accounts. See, for example: (Starr 2011), (Jacobs and 




dependents are twenty-six years old may they be barred from their parent’s health plan. 
The law limits consumer’s out-of-pocket costs, disallows health plans from using annual 
or lifetime bans, and forbids rescissions (canceling a member’s coverage) except in the 
case of outright fraud.  
Insurance companies face restrictions on their premiums. At least eighty percent 
of premiums must be spent on medical costs and this “medical loss ratio” must be 
publicly reported each year. If the plan does not spend at least eighty percent of its 
premiums on medical costs, a rebate is returned to the enrollees. Older enrollees cannot 
be charged more than three times that of the premiums of younger people. The law also 
legislates how health plans may market their plans, including the language used in 
describing the plan, and mandates additional annual reporting from health insurance 
companies on the quality and cost of their coverage.  
Subtitle D mandates the creation of the American Health Benefit Exchange in 
each state, through which businesses and individuals may purchase health plans. All 
health plans sold on the exchanges must meet standardized minimums regarding the 
essential health benefits covered. The fifth subtitle, E, creates a series of tax credits to 
help assist individuals and small businesses paying for the health insurance premiums, 
specifies maximum for premiums and cost-sharing, and provides for cost-sharing 
subsidies for individuals enrolled in plans sold on the exchanges.  
The law also levies penalties for individuals who do not carry adequate health 
insurance for the year. Subtitle F requires employers with over two-hundred employees to 
automatically enroll new employees in exchanges. Employers with fifty or more 
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employees must pay a penalty if any worker qualifies for a subsidy to purchase health 
insurance on the newly created exchanges.  
Title II: Role of Public Programs 
The second title mandates significant changes to Medicaid and sets a new national 
income standard for Medicaid eligibility. All individuals and families with incomes less 
than 133 percent of the federal poverty level may enroll. The law also increases support 
for the Children’s Health Insurance Program and makes the enrollment process for these 
programs simpler.  
Title IX: Revenue Provisions 
The provisions in Title IX account for nearly one half of the revenue needed to 
pay for the premium subsidies, cost sharing reductions, and Medicaid expansions 
specified in the first two titles. Estimates from the Congressional Budget Office predicted 
that most of this revenue would be raised from raising the Medicare hospital insurance 
tax base for the high-income taxpayers. Other revenue raising provisions include annual 
fees for health insurance companies and companies that manufacture or import branded 
pharmaceuticals. High-cost health plans, manufacturers and importers of medical devices, 
and indoor tanning services are taxed at higher rates.  
The ACA and Neoliberalism Under Challenge 
In signing the ACA, President Obama accomplished what many of his 
predecessors had attempted and failed: he signed a piece of major healthcare legislation 
with ramifications for the system’s structure, regulation, and financing. Although the 
ACA continues to develop the idiosyncratic and piecemeal nature of the U.S. healthcare 
system, the law’s passage defied trends of recent history. In many important ways, it also 
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defied hallmarks of the neoliberal SSA. In this section, I analyze the relationship between 
the institutions and dominant ideas of the neoliberal SSA and selected aspects of the 
Affordable Care Act.  
Contradictions of the ACA with the Neoliberal SSA 
Title I of the ACA includes many features that run contrary to the cohesive set of 
institutions and dominant ideas that promoted the growth of and stability of the neoliberal 
era. For example, one major characteristic of the neoliberal SSA is the increasing reliance 
on market forces and an accompanying decrease in the role of government regulation. 
The regulations described in Title I, however, represent significant increases in the 
regulatory requirements of health insurance plans. To be sold on the exchanges, all health 
insurance plans must meet standardized requirements concerning their product. They face 
restrictions on the pricing of the product, as well as how product is marketed, and how 
the revenue they collect in selling their product is used.  
Another critical aspect of the neoliberal SSA is the emphasis on individual 
decisions and consumer sovereignty. The first title of the ACA deviates from this 
principle. The individual mandate penalizes all individuals who do not carry adequate 
health insurance throughout the year. Thus, a consumer’s decisions concerning whether 
to purchase health insurance and, if so, what type of health insurance to purchase is 
superseded.  
The first title of the law also includes a massive expansion in public provisioning, 
which again is antithetical to market allocation and individual decision making. The cost-
sharing subsidies and premium tax credits represent an increased responsibility of the 
federal government to purchase private health insurance for individuals. Although the law 
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does not create a government-run health insurer or government-owned healthcare system, 
these transfers increase the public provision of private health insurance plans. 
Similarly, the creation of the American Health Benefit Exchange signifies an 
important expansion in the role of the government in the provision of private health 
insurance. States are required to create institutions that facilitate the purchase of private 
health insurance by individuals and employers. These exchanges, which the law specifies 
may be run by either a state agency or nonprofit organization, are gatekeepers to the 
market for private health insurance that individuals are legally required to purchase. 
The exchanges only permit plans which meet certain standards benefits and levels 
of coverage to be sold. Of the plans that meet these requirements, an insurance plan may 
be barred from the exchange if state regulators conclude that the insurer has raised prices 
too high. In addition, every state’s exchange must sell two health insurance plans selected 
by the federal government. The exchanges also determine whether consumers are 
qualified to buy through an exchange and their eligibility for federal subsidies. A quality-
rating system, created by the federal government, is made available on the exchanges for 
each health insurance plan to assist with comparison shopping. 
The exchanges increase the scope of the government’s role in the provision of 
private health insurance. Even within that reduced role of the market provisioning, the 
design of the exchanges still further represents an important shift away from the set of 
institutions and ideas that define the neoliberal SSA. The design of the exchanges 
promotes social pooling: the medical risks of people who would otherwise be purchasing 




One of the most visible ways that the ACA defies the limits of the neoliberal SSA 
its massive expansion of the Medicaid program. The Congressional Budget Office 
predicted that if the ACA were implemented as it was written, that enrollment in 
Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program would increase by roughly 16 
million (Congressional Budget Office 2010). The ACA is the largest increase in the 
public provision of health insurance for lower-income people since Medicaid’s creation 
in 1965. This expansion reversed many of the trends of the neoliberal era, in which social 
provisioning became less popular and less comprehensive. Government programs are 
considered inherently inefficient according to the dominant ideas of the neoliberal SSA. 
Adding an additional 16 million of people to these programs, equivalent to over thirty 
percent of the average 2009 monthly enrollment in these programs, is a significant 
strengthening of the public welfare state (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
2009 Table I.16).  
This expansion in coverage in the private and public health insurance programs 
corresponded with a massive expansion in public revenues to provide the premium and 
cost-sharing subsidies to families with incomes up to four hundred percent of the federal 
poverty level. A major source of these expansions come from increases in Medicare 
payroll taxes for high income earners and from an additional tax on investment income. 
The increase in public funding redistributes income and effectively shields individuals 
from the cost of their health insurance and health treatments. These two trends further 
defy the primacy of market forces. They are also a reversal of many previous policy 
trends, which lowered taxes for high earners and attempted to increase efficiency in the 
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health insurance market by shifting financial responsibility for payments to healthcare 
consumers.  
The ACA’s Adherence to the Neoliberal SSA 
Despite the notable deviations, it would be inappropriate to describe the ACA as a 
radical departure from the set of institutions and ideas that define the neoliberal SSA. As 
discussed above, there is evidence of a meaningful shift in terms of the role of the 
government and the primacy of market forces following the financial crisis. However, a 
new social structure of accumulation and its corresponding set of institutions and 
dominant ideas did not immediately emerge to replace the neoliberal SSA. Many aspects 
of the ACA are compatible with the characteristics of neoliberalism. 
The first title of the law, despite its regulations on health insurers, falls within the 
broader neoliberal era in its commitment to maintain private health insurance. The 
individual mandate violates the sanctity of individuals to make their own purchasing 
decisions. Yet it also supports a system of health insurance that relies on individual 
choices, for example between different tiers of health insurance plans. Health insurance 
continues to be framed as a commodity available through several alternative plans, not as 
a right equally available to all.  
Although the expansion of public revenues for premium and cost-sharing 
subsidies reverse the trends of weakening welfare programs, it should also be noted that 
an increase in public spending itself is not a rejection of the neoliberal SSA. Neoliberal 
ideology does not prescribe an erasure of the state; it requires public spending to 
function. However, much of the state spending in the neoliberal era is somewhat 
obscured, while the expanded spending called for in the ACA is visible.  
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The Public Option 
The ACA is neither purely market-based nor socialized health insurance. Its 
combination of promoting a private industry by mandating and subsidizing individuals’ 
purchase of health insurance and its expansion of government-funded health insurance 
reflect the unique economic restructuring of the time. The marriage between market 
competition and public provision was also reflected in the debate over the creation of a 
publicly health insurance plan, often called the public option. In some variations of the 
public option, this government run health insurance plan would be compete with the 
private plans sold on the exchanges.  
The public option had not been a dominating feature of previous debates over 
healthcare reform.33 However, in the wake of the financial crisis and Great Recession, it 
became an important point of debate in the lead up to the passage of the ACA and 
emerged as a serious possibility for reform. It was ultimately excluded from the final 
legislation, but some version of the public option was included in bills passed by three 
House committees and a Senate committee. Even more striking, the full House of 
Representatives passed a bill in November of 2009 that included the creation of the 
public option. (Halpin and Harbage 2010) 
Despite its ultimate exclusion, the serious consideration of the public option 
further exemplifies the ways in which the broader context of economic restructuring and 
uncertainty of the time helped facilitate healthcare legislation that moved beyond the 
previous constraints of the neoliberal SSA. A government health insurance plan 
 
33 Two healthcare proposals from 2001 are credited with developing the public option. 
See (Halpin and Harbage 2010) for a more thorough history of the policy. 
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ostensibly could outcompete and entirely eliminate the private the health insurance 
industry. The omission of the public option reflects the aspects of neoliberal capitalism 
that were able to withstand the challenge of the crisis.  
Interest Groups 
Following the challenge to neoliberal capitalism, the organizations representing 
insurance companies and big business executives took a much different approach to 
healthcare reform than they did in the 1990s. As described in the previous case study, in 
the 1990s the HIAA successfully launched a very public attack against healthcare 
reforms. In 2008, their successor organization, America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) 
expressed public support for specific proposals, even those that would increase their 
industry’s regulatory requirements and change their business. Similarly, the Business 
Roundtable publicly supported the ACA, but it had opposed the Clinton health reform 
and offered only mild vocal support for the most conservative alternatives to the Clinton 
health plan.  
Why would these organizations publicly oppose the Clinton health reforms, but 
then support reforms in 2008? Did employers and insurance companies become more 
generous than their 1990s counterparts? Was the ACA more beneficial to their industry’s 
bottom line? Or was the Obama administration more effective at negotiating with these 
groups? The discussion below analyzes how the passage of the ACA was conditioned by 
the concurrent threat to the existing neoliberal SSA.  
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Health Insurance Companies 
Contradictions of the Neoliberal SSA 
Although the institutions of neoliberal capitalism created a profitable health 
insurance industry over the 1980s and the 1990s, these same institutions began to create 
some problems for insurers in the mid-2000s. For example, the neoliberal era is 
characterized by a class relationship in which capital dominates labor. Labor’s decreased 
bargaining power in the neoliberal SSA helped facilitate insurers and businesses passing 
over rising shares of healthcare costs onto families and workers. As healthcare costs 
continued to rise and labor’s power declined, employment-based health insurance became 
increasingly rare. Some employers defied these trends and continued to offer 
employment-based health insurance, but these companies became more likely to self-
insure. Large employers increasingly used health insurance companies solely as third-
party administrators. Employers would collect premiums, manage a trust that paid the 
healthcare costs, and use a stop-loss insurance policy to prevent unexpectedly high 
medical costs from wiping out their trust. Self-insuring allows firms to maintain greater 
control over their cash flow.  
The trend of self-insurance is a manifestation of the development of the 
institutions and ideas of neoliberal capitalism. The form of health insurance that 
developed following the failure of the Clinton healthcare plan made employment-based 
health insurance increasingly rare. In the cases where it continued, employers took on the 
additional risk of paying for their workers’ healthcare costs. As argued in Hacker (2019), 
under neoliberal capitalism, people and firms take on more risk. 
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Only offering administrative services generated less money for insurance plans 
relative to their underwriting services for risk-based insurance. Declining revenues 
necessitated a shift in business models for insurers. Major health plans shifting to 
devoting a larger share of their services to administering government programs, such as 
Medicare and Medicaid. Sue Peters, president of government health plans for Aetna, 
confirmed the strategy: 
 “…as we look from a macroeconomic point of view, we know the 
government sector is growing at a faster rate than commercial or 
employer-based healthcare” (qtd. in Berry 2008, 200).  
 
The CEO and president of Humana was similarly optimistic about increasing 
government revenues: 
“Medicare continues to show that it is the best near-term opportunity for 
significant growth in the industry. Medicare, however, is not just a near-
term growth opportunity. It will be a growth opportunity for many years 
to come” (qtd. in Berry 2008). 
 
Beyond Medicare, insurance plans also specifically targeted veterans’ care as a 
growth business. A HealthNet CEO commented that, 
 “the demand [for mental health services], fueled by the large number of 
Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans, [is] a positive surprise, which I think 
we anticipate to be ongoing” (qtd. in Berry 2007). 
 
By November 2007, three major health insurance companies, WellPoint, 
UnitedHealth Group, and Coventry, each reported that the growth in their government-
related earnings outpaced the decline in the commercial sector. The health insurance 
industry’s increasing reliance on government spending reflects another way that the 
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industry has developed under neoliberalism.34 In the United States, total privatization of 
government services like Social Security, Medicare, and the Veterans Health 
Administration have not occurred. Instead certain aspects of these services are outsourced 
to private companies. Davis (2009, 37) describes this development as the creation of a 
“portfolio society” in which the state functions as a “portfolio of object and functions that 
can be sliced off and privatized.” 
Beyond adjusting their business models to administer more government financed 
healthcare services, insurers also diversified their business by offering money 
management and banking services as well. Their increased involvement in financial 
services also reflects their adaption to neoliberal institutions and norms. As the costs of 
healthcare were shifted to consumers, the growth of health savings accounts increased.  
Large health plans accordingly established FDIC-approved banks to manage these 
accounts. An August 2007 report released by Diamond Management &Technology 
Consultants estimated that by generating revenues from asset management and 
transaction and maintenance fees, the “health/wealth” market could generate $40 billion 
of revenue within the next five years. As of December 2008, WellPoint, UnitedHealth 
Group, and the BlueCross BlueShield Association had each established a bank. (Berry 
2008) 
 
34 This integration of government public spending into the business model of private 
health insurers may appear contradictory during the neoliberal era. However, as noted 
above, neoliberal ideology does not advocate for the erasure of the state. Even during the 
neoliberal era, the U.S. pays large and increasing portions of spending on public 
healthcare programs. The state has important roles in neoliberalism for helping to 
promote economic stability and enforcing private property contracts. 
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The development of the health insurance industry in the early 2000s reflects the 
unique environment of the neoliberal SSA. As the set of institutions and dominant ideas 
became more entrenched, they also created the conditions that forced the industry to 
adapt. Large insurance companies expected their business to come from handling public 
revenues and from marketing financial products. It was this context – needing to 
structurally adjust how they made profits – in which insurers began to offer their 
proposals for healthcare reforms.  
AHIP’s initial stance towards healthcare reform  
The initial proposals offered by AHIP, the lobbying organization representing the 
largest health insurance plans, matched the changing conditions of the health insurance 
industry that developed under the neoliberal SSA. In November of 2006, the AHIP board 
of directors announced a proposal to expand accessibility to health in insurance to 
uninsured Americans. The proposal’s key elements included two federal tax initiatives: 
establishing a health tax credit for children and the creation of universal health accounts 
(UHAs). These new accounts would be a vehicle for pre-tax payment of medical 
expenses. The organization proposed a 50% federal match for individuals’ contributions 
to their UHAs (America's Health Insurance Plans, 2006). The proposals matched the 
changing realities in the insurance industry, reflecting both an expanding reliance on 
government revenue for health insurers as well as their growing interest in managing 
health accounts.  
In December 2007, the board of directors expanded their proposal and offered 
their recommendations for reforms in the individual market, despite their observation that 
“individually purchased health care coverage is more affordable and accessible than may 
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be widely known” (America’s Health Insurance Plans, 2007). Nevertheless, to address 
the problem of people who cannot purchase health insurance coverage in the individual 
market, the board recommended that creation of state Guarantee Access Plans (GAP) to 
provide coverage for uninsured individuals with the highest expected medical costs. Once 
all individuals with the highest medical costs were covered by the state government, 
health plans guaranteed to issue coverage to anyone who was ineligible for GAP, with 
premium rates limited at 1.5 times the standard market rates. The board of directors also 
proposed that health plans limit rescissions only in cases of fraud. They also proposed 
that rescission decisions and pre-existing condition exclusions should be subject to a 
third-party review process, provided by the states. Their proposal is not an offer to 
sincerely adjust the practices of the industry, but a means to formally remove unprofitable 
individuals from participating in the individual markets, protecting private profits in the 
market.  
After the Financial Crisis 
Following the financial crisis, AHIP dramatically expanded their proposals for 
healthcare reform. In November 2008, AHIP Board of Directors released a statement on 
healthcare reform, which departed from their statements in the three years prior. Insurers 
announced that they would support guarantee issue for private health insurance coverage 
without pre-existing condition exclusion alongside a mandate for individuals to purchase 
insurance. Their proposal for universal coverage no longer included any mention of 
Guaranteed Access Plans, nor of lowering the cost of healthcare, or eliminating 
unnecessary healthcare services (America's Health Insurance Plans, 2008).  
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In December, the group formally released their plan, titled “Now is the Time for 
Health Care Reform: A proposal to achieve universal coverage, affordability, quality 
improvement and market reform.” The report featured strong language committing health 
insurers to participating in the process of healthcare reform and acknowledged their role 
in deterring past reforms. The opening of their statement notes “Although health care 
reform has been on the nation’s agenda for many years, the varied interests of 
stakeholders have held back progress” (America's Health Insurance Plans, 2008). 
However, AHIP promises in the following sentence: 
“Next year provides a new opportunity to transcend these traditional 
barriers and achieve a more sustainable health care system that provides 
affordable, high-quality coverage for all Americans.”  
 
The health plans no longer only pledged that they “welcomed the challenge of 
working with policy makers and our stakeholder partners to improve the health care 
system and extend coverage to all Americans,” as they did in their three previous 
proposals (America's Health Insurance Plans, 2008). Instead, the health plans called for a 
more inclusive process: 
 “[We] offer our proposals with a pledge to work in a spirit of 
cooperation and determination, with physicians, hospitals, consumers, 
employers, unions, lawmakers, and government leaders who want to 
work toward the day when all Americans can count on being served by 
a health care system second to none. Working together – starting in 2009 
– can achieve the goal.” 
 
The language suggests a change in intention to be a part of the process of 
healthcare reform alongside a confession that they had not fully committed themselves to 
cooperating with reform earlier. The rest of the proposal includes several more 
substantial changes. Unlike the plan released in May 2008, which outlined a plan to cut 
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healthcare costs by $145 billion by 2015, in the December 2008 proposal, health insurers 
propose savings of over $500 billion over five years. No longer are Universal Health 
Accounts or Guaranteed Access Plans promoted to achieve the savings. In its place, 
AHIP suggests that “insurance market rules need to be reformed” and calls for a “public-
private advisory group representing a broad range of stakeholders with relevant policy 
experience” to develop proposals to eliminate wasteful spending. The December 2008 
press release also calls for the creation of an essential benefit plan.  
In the beginning of the new year, AHIP seemed to follow through on its promise 
to work towards healthcare reform. In March 2009, at President Obama’s first public 
event regarding health care reform, AHIP president Karen Ignani made a public 
commitment to constructively work towards health care reform: 
“We want to work with you. We want to work with the members of 
Congress on a bipartisan basis here. You have our commitment. We hear 
the American people about what’s not working. We’ve taken that 
seriously. You have our commitment to play, to contribute, and to help 
pass health care reform this year” (The White House 2009).  
 
As the debate over healthcare reform continued in the first few months of 
President Obama’s term, insurers continued to indicate a willingness to participate in 
major reforms in their industry. On June 19, AHIP announced their support for 
discontinuing rating based on health status or gender (America's Health Insuranace Plans, 
2009). The switch away from experience rated premiums had long been a controversial 
aspect of healthcare reform. Experience ratings allow insurance companies to charge 
individuals based on their characteristics as consumers in a market transaction. By not 
charging individuals based on their gender or health status, the insurers were supporting a 
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move to a system that socialized the costs of providing to care to people likely to need 
more.  
In the 1990s, AHIP’s predecessor organization argued that without being able to 
price individuals according to their risk, that the insurance industry would be no longer 
profitable. Notably AHIP announced their support for not having ratings based on health 
status or gender in the same press release that they publicly announced their opposition to 
the public option: 
“We share the concerns that providers, employers, and patients have 
raised about the significant unintended consequences of a government-
run plan. It would dismantle employer-based coverage, add additional 
liabilities to the federal budget, and turn back the clock on efforts to 
improve quality and safety” (America's Health Insurance Plans, 2009). 
 
The language and tone used in this announcement is mild. There are no threats of 
a “socialist takeover” by the government and the organization notes that they are only 
echoing others’ concerns. They do not include any concerns that are industry-specific to 
insurers competing against a government plan. This sharply differs from the language of 
the 1990s, when health insurers argued that would no longer be profitable without 
experience ratings and they could use the rallying cry of markets and private innovation 
to defend themselves. 
 A concern that a public plan would “dismantle employer-based coverage and add 
additional liabilities to the federal budget” is much more muted than the “they choose, we 
lose” slogan from decades previous. Their relatively subdued language against the 
possibility of a government-run health insurance plan is striking and speaks to the 
changed institutions under which insurers were now fighting.  
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Even though the government run competitor was potentially a graver threat to the 
private health insurance industry than many elements of the Clinton Health Plan, 
rejecting healthcare reform outright was not an option for the industry in 2008 as it was in 
1990s. It was no longer a safe strategy for insurers to fight openly against being pitted 
against a government run healthcare plan, which was significantly more statist than any 
element of the Clinton Healthcare Plan. Following the financial crisis, while faced with 
questions over the future of capitalism more broadly, insurers considered it unwise to 
appear as oppositional to reform.  
Like the banking industry, their industry needed reforms to continue. Private 
health insurance would not be as profitable in the future without increased public 
spending. This was partly because private health insurers were themselves challenged 
with the contradictions of neoliberal capitalism within their industry. The institutions and 
ideology that had promoted profits in their industry previously had failed them and 
significant changes were needed for their existence to continue. 
The Business Roundtable 
The Business Roundtable, an organization representing the CEOs of large 
corporations, also signaled willingness to support healthcare reform in the lead up to the 
2008 elections. Their proposals echoed or complemented their insurer’s proposals. Like 
the health insurers, the Business Roundtable published proposals for healthcare reform 
that conceded no meaningful increased regulatory requirements or increased 
responsibility for healthcare coverage.  
Their recommendations included removing regulatory barriers that limit insurance 
options, offering more consumer-centric health plans, investing in health information 
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technology, promoting comparative effectiveness research, changing provider 
reimbursement structure and medical liability laws, and promoting end-of-life care 
options. Each recommendation focuses on two important elements of market efficiency: 
reducing regulation and increasing the information available to consumers and producers. 
Faced with the failure of market logic to rectify the problems of increasing costs and 
rising numbers of the uninsured the Business Roundtable acknowledged the need for 
reforms.  
The Business Roundtable also meaningfully expanded their commitment to 
healthcare reform following the financial crisis. Instead of repeating their support for 
consumer-centered and market-focused reforms, the organization signaled an openness 
towards guarantee issue and eliminating exclusions for pre-existing conditions. Instead of 
remaining on the sidelines of reform, as they had in the 1990s, in August of 2009 the 
organization said they were actively supporting and working towards reform: 
“To achieve this [reform] we have been working closely with all players 
on a bipartisan basis to change the system. We’ve been in near constant 
communications with the White House and Congress and we believe 
we’re working as an honest broker to bring about reform” (Business 
Roundtable, 2009).  
 
In the same conference, John Castellani, the president of the Business Roundtable, 
indicated for the first time that they could support an employer-mandate for healthcare 
reform: “We know the direction they’re going and we think it could be worked out to be 
acceptable for us.” 
The group’s language supporting other aspects of healthcare reform became even 
stronger as the healthcare debate continued. In a letter to President Obama, Castellani 
emphasized that his organization “strongly” supports guaranteed issue as well as limiting 
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plans’ ability to set ratings. None of their previously released statements indicated 
support for regulations on insurance pricing. The organization followed these statements 
with a report titled “Health Care Reform: The Perils of Inaction” which predicted dire 
consequences for employment-based health insurance if no reform was passed. They 
abandoned promoting the multi-state plans from their previous statements and urged 
legislators to “support aggressive insurance market reforms” to solve the rapidly 
increasing costs of health insurance, which they described as a “real problem from not 
just a social perspective but also an economic viewpoint”.  
The public comments, reports, and advertisements from the Business Roundtable 
are all significant changes from the 1990s struggle over healthcare reform. The lobbying 
organization was warned by the Clinton administration that failure to enact healthcare 
reform could lead to the passage of a single-payer healthcare reform. However, this threat 
did not seem credible at the height of neoliberal capitalism when the dominant ideology 
and institutions were supporting an expanding U.S. economy. In that context, the 
Business Roundtable distanced themselves from reform and objected to the Clinton’s 
proposals.  
Employers did not universally support all aspects of healthcare reform in this 
period, however. They maintained a strong opposition to the public option, despite the 
potential advantages for their bottom line. When a reporter commented that an expanding 
government plan could ultimately rid employers of the increasing costs of health 
insurance, the president of the Business Roundtable indicated that the executives opposed 
this proposal based on anticipated future expansions of a government-run plan. “The 
institution itself seeks ways for it to grow,” Castellani said, “It’s just the nature of the 
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way things work” (Business Roundtable, 2009). The language suggests that the 
organization viewed the public option as a potential catalyst for more significant 
government intervention and regulation. 
In November 2009, the full House of Representatives passed a healthcare bill that 
included the public option. Notably, its passage still did not launch the Business 
Roundtable into a public fight against healthcare reform. The Roundtable released a 
relatively mild public statement expressing disapproval for the established public option: 
 “We are disappointed by the passage of a House bill that we cannot 
support. The House legislation contains many provisions that will 
threaten the coverage that 177 million Americans currently have through 
the employer-based system. Not only does it establish a government-run 
health plan, but it includes a “play or pay” mandate for employers that 
would limit the flexibility employers have to develop innovative plans 
for our employees” (Business Roundtable, 2009). 
 
A few days after this announcement, the Business Roundtable, released a study 
supporting the passage of healthcare reform. The study concluded that “if enacted 
properly, the right reforms” could save employers $3,000 of healthcare costs for each 
employee (2009). The study drew immediate attention from the Obama administration 
and the President cited the Business Roundtable Study in speeches to rally support for the 
legislation.  
Even though the public option would be a massive expansion in state power, the 
organization was much more restrained in its public opposition to the reform. The 
destabilization of the market ideology, the threat of potential increased power of labor 
and citizen groups, and the slackening benefits of neoliberal capitalism all created an 
environment where the threat of more significant government action was more credible in 
the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis.    
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On December 19, after it became clear that a public option would not pass the 
Senate, John Castellani sent a letter to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid thanking him 
for his “efforts to improve the health care reform legislation currently being considered 
by the United States Senate” (Business Roundtable, 2009) .He articulated his group’s 
approval of Senate’s bill and reiterated their opposition to the House bill: 
“The proposed legislation is a step toward our shared goal of providing 
high quality, affordable health care for all Americans. As background, 
we have been very clear that the legislation which passed the House 
earlier this year went in the wrong direction and would have serious 
negative consequences for America’s health care system. We need to 
continue to take further steps in the right direction and not erode the 
improvements that have been made to the Senate bill during the process 
of conference with the House and enactment” (ibid). 
 
After opposing the House bill, the BRT dropped their opposition to the Senate bill 
after it became clear that the public option would not pass in the Senate. This indicates 
that the group feared that the public option could lead to a government takeover of 
healthcare provision. While such a direction did not seem plausible in the 1990s, this 
threat now seemed possible. Thus, the BRT and insurers focused not on rejecting all 
reforms, but instead on stopping the public option. Passing a major reform was necessary 
to stave of this bigger threat of an eventual government takeover of health insurance, a 
precedent that they had good reason to fear in 2010. Their ultimate support of healthcare 
reforms following the removal of the public option in the Senate was influential in the 
final passage of the bill. 
Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of Independent Businesses 
The Business Roundtable was not the only group lobbying on behalf of business 
owners on issues of healthcare reform. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National 
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Federation of Independent Businesses, two organizations that identify themselves as 
representing small businesses, also testified and ran ads regarding health reform in these 
periods. As in prior discussions of healthcare reform in the 1990s, both organizations 
remained steadfast in their opposition to reform in 2010. 
Their arguments echoed that of their previous campaigns. The National 
Federation of Independent Businesses threatened that an employer mandate would lead to 
economic recession, discouraged production, and job loss for the most vulnerable 
employees (Roundtable Discussions on Health Care Reform 2009, 241). The Chamber of 
Commerce described an employer mandate as a “job-killer” and the public option as a 
“backdoor way to bring single-payer, socialized medicine” (p. 321). Both arguments were 
successful in stopping the Clinton administration’s healthcare legislation. However, the 
existing challenges to the neoliberal SSA in this period created the conditions where big 
business groups and health insurance companies were willing to accept healthcare 
reform. Without the additional support of big business groups, their opposition to major 
healthcare reforms was unheeded.  
The change in the phase of the SSA did not affect these organization’s arguments 
against healthcare reform. However, there is a significant difference in the Chamber of 
Commerce’s role in healthcare reform in this period. After the law’s passage in March of 
2010, a journalist from Bloomberg broke the news that AHIP, the lobbying organization 
for health insurance companies, had donated over $86 million to the Chamber of 
Commerce (Armstrong 2010). The funds, which the Chamber of Commerce confirmed 
paid for advertisements and grassroots events to oppose the healthcare bill, exceeded the 
group’s entire budget from the previous year.  
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Some commentators have suggested that this action by insurers means that all 
their comments supporting healthcare reform were disingenuous, and that they 
maintained the fierce opposition to healthcare reform in 2008-2010 as they did in the 
early 1990s. However, even though the health insurance companies were secretly funding 
advertisements to delay or block healthcare reform, it does not indicate that the insurers 
were merely repeating their previous ploys. In the nineties, Chip Kahn and the HIAA did 
not have to secretly fund television advertisements. The Harry and Louise ads were 
explicitly funded by the Coalition for Health Insurance Choices, a group that HIAA 
publicly addressed creating. The fact insurers kept these payments in secret speaks to the 
transformed environment after the financial crisis where industry executives were more 
fearful of public backlash.  
Even though the government-run competitor was potentially a graver threat to the 
private health insurance industry than many elements of the Clinton Health Plan, 
rejecting healthcare reform outright was not an option for the industry in 2008 and the 
two following years in which the struggles played out, as it was in 1990s. It was no 
longer a safe strategy for insurers to fight openly against being pitted against a 
government run healthcare plan. Following the financial crisis, while faced with 
questions over the future of capitalism more broadly, insurers considered it unwise to 
appear as oppositional to reform. Thus, they had to relay their arguments against reform 
through other organizations that had maintained consistent opposition. 
Labor and Citizen Groups 
Like the organizations representing small business groups, labor and citizen 
groups also maintained their stance on healthcare reform across each period of the SSA. 
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Unions and public-interest groups were vocal proponents for many aspects of healthcare 
reform, including regulations on insurers, the establishment of the exchange, the 
expansion of Medicaid, subsidies for lower and middle-income families, and a mandatory 
employer contribution. These groups were also among the most active supporters of the 
public option.  
In previous debates, which did not feature discussions of a public option, the labor 
unions and citizen groups demanded the establishment of a single payer healthcare 
system. Some groups, for example Disabled for Action, California Nurses Union, and 
Physicians for a National Health Plan maintained a strict devotion to the establishment of 
a single-payer healthcare plan. Some labor organizations, such as the AFL-CIO, 
continued to voice support for single-payer but viewed the public option as consistent 
with their long-term support of universal coverage based on a social insurance model 
(Health Care Reform Roundtable (Part I) 2009, 44). Health Care for Action Now 
(HCAN), a coalition of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees, the Service Employees International Union, and the United Food and 
Commercial Workers, and the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now 
explicitly supported and organized in favor of the public option.  
In the period after the financial crisis and Great Recession, the arguments used to 
support the establishment of a public option gained credibility. The language of 
competitive and deregulated markets were no longer effective slogans to stir opposition 
for healthcare reform. The deregulation of the financial industry was considered a 
precipitating factor in the financial crisis and Great Recession. Supporters compared 
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opposition towards health insurance reform to support for the earlier financial services 
deregulation that had helped devastate the economy.  
 Public option supporters also benefitted from a resentment towards the 
tremendous profits of health insurance companies. Health insurance executives were 
compared to the bankers receiving bonuses after their bailouts. HCAN staged a mass 
citizen’s arrest of insurance company executives at a conference in March of 2010. The 
conference hotel was covered with banners reading “Corporate Crime Scene.” Attendees 
were deputized to arrest the insurance executive CEOs,  
“whose greed, corporate abuses, and craven lobbying pose a mortal 
threat to our democracy and the health and well-being of our people” 
(Kirsch 1997, 335). 
 
Opponents of health reform repeatedly named the public option as a Trojan horse 
policy, which would ultimately lead to creation of a single-payer or nationalized 
healthcare system. However, the establishment of a government-run health insurer was 
no longer exclusively considered as a radical option guaranteeing government take over. 
Some supporters of the public option saw the policy as an opportunity to give people 
choice and a chance to “vote with their feet” on whether private health insurance system 
could be sustainable. Leadership from the AFL-CIO argued that it was no longer credible 
to believe that the current private health insurance system would be able to contain costs 
and promote universal coverage: 
“We think that, as soon as feasible, an immediate implementation of a 
public health insurance plan option is essential. The private insurers have 
had plenty of opportunity to [put competition into the insurance market] 
on their own and they have failed to do it … We need to keep them 




The discussion of healthcare reform in this period following the financial crisis 
included another feature new to the debate: a stronger focus on the macroeconomy. It 
became common to associate healthcare reform with the reinvigoration of the economy. 
Proponents of healthcare reform compared their proposals to Keynesian policies to 
increase aggregate demand. At a Senate hearing concerning healthcare reform and the 
overall state of the U.S. economy, economist Uwe Reinhardt explained the economic 
consequences of healthcare reform, by comparing universal coverage to tax cuts: 
 “The problem with a tax cut is, you do not know how the people who 
get it will spend it. Will they put it into offshore mutual funds? Will they 
buy a Ferrari? You have no control. But, if you put it into health care, it 
will, in fact, create American jobs because we do not import healthcare 
… It turns out health care is the job machine in the U.S.” (Health Care 
Reform: An Economic Perspective 2008) 
 
President of the Service Employees International Union Andy Stern used similar 
logic. He described universal health care as an opportunity for training workers and 
creating jobs. He also cited the necessity of universal healthcare coverage to increase 
spending: 
“But more importantly, if people do not have a sense of health care 
security they are not going to purchase at the levels we need to revive 
consumer spending … we need people to be secure and feel like they can 
spend” (ibid.). 
 
Senator Rockefeller made the most explicit comparison between the financial 
crisis and U.S. healthcare: 
“The current economic crisis … is also a crisis of healthcare. They are 
one and the same. Stabilizing our health care system is a critical 
component of putting our economy back on track. Leading economists 
have all agreed that our costly and inefficient healthcare system is 
perhaps the biggest threat to the Nation’s budget. So health care is not 




By November 2008, connecting what was described as the worst depression since 
the Great Depression to the problems in U.S. healthcare is a remarkable comparison. 
Lehman Brother’s collapse in September and the fragility of the financial system, has no 
obvious tangible connection to the problems of U.S. healthcare. Politicians usually 
discussed the problems of healthcare in the United States in terms of the increasing 
numbers of uninsured individuals and the rising costs of healthcare. These trends had 
been in place prior to the problems in the financial industry. However, the health 
insurance and the financial markets are connected in their reliance on the institutions and 
ideas of neoliberal capitalism, currently under significant challenge. The unique 
economic moment strengthened the arguments of proponents of healthcare reform.  
Conclusion 
Although the legislation disappointed many who had hoped for more significant 
change, the ACA is a major piece of legislation with important consequences for the 
entirety of U.S. healthcare. Previous histories and accounts of the Affordable Care Act 
have not systematically analyzed how the changing conditions of capitalism played an 
important role in shaping this legislation. This case study analyzed how the dynamics of 
capitalism and its historically specific set of institutions and corresponding ideas helped 
shape the Affordable Care Act.  
I argue that the contradictions of the neoliberal SSA helped create the conditions 
that primed the insurers for structural changes to the organization of their industry. Great 
Recession, the worst the U.S. economy experienced since the Great Depression, severely 
weakened the established institutions and ideas of the neoliberal SSA. In the context of 
these changing and unstable dynamics, interest groups and arguments that previously did 
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not hold power gained credibility. Industry stakeholders were threatened with the 
possibility of significant industry restructuring. The possibility of a government-run 
health insurance plan was plausible. In this context, these stakeholders, who successfully 
and steadfastly and successfully had previously opposed healthcare reform despite its 
being beneficial to their interests in some respects, softened their approach and conceded 







These case studies provide a framework for understanding the history of 
healthcare reform in the United States that complements and extends the existing 
literature. They highlight the role that the changing conditions of capitalism have played 
in the development of healthcare reforms. This helps explain why particular interest 
groups were effective when they were and why the ineffective arguments of one time 
period became an effective means to deter healthcare reform in the next.  
Medicare and Medicaid were passed in the postwar period, in which citizen and 
labor groups were more powerful in pushing for the expansion of the U.S. welfare state. 
During this period, memories of the Great Depression and the increased threat of 
socialism conditioned U.S. businesses to be more accepting of government regulation and 
involvement in the economy. By the 1990s, this form of postwar capitalism was long 
gone. A decades-long campaign led by a united coalition of large and small businesses 
helped shift the class relation back in capital’s favor. The realm of market relations 
usurped what had previously been in the purview of the government and unions. 
In this era the goals of healthcare reform were to provide expanded access and 
quality of care to a larger group of Americans. But healthcare reform in this period was 
also seen as a means to further promote market relations within the industry and to roll 
back the fiduciary responsibility of the federal and state government in healthcare. The 
Clinton administration’s proposal for healthcare reform was designed to shift the large 
public programs of the U.S. welfare state, Medicare, Medicaid, and the Veterans Health 
Administration into private competitive health plans. Yet even these reforms were not 
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acceptable to business groups or insurers. Maintaining the status-quo healthcare system 
was permissible in this period when the threat of government takeover or single-payer 
healthcare reform was negligible. 
These conditions dramatically changed in the context of the global financial crisis 
of 2008. With the largest banks in the country failing or coming under government 
control and unemployment numbers rising into the millions, the neoliberal structure of 
the 1990s was temporarily but severely weakened. The threat of a national government-
run insurance plan seemed plausible to many stakeholders. Insurers and businesses made 
large concessions and dropped their strong public resistance, infallible in the 1990s, to 
prevent major reforms such as the establishment of the public option.  
The shifting conditions of capitalism have had a major role in shaping healthcare 
reform. Previous histories of the U.S. healthcare system have neglected this important 
component. This analysis builds on SSA theory’s focus on the role that the rate of 
capitalist accumulation has on the pace of the economy and the cohesive set of 
institutions that is needed to stabilize and sustain accumulation. These dynamics and the 
historically specific set of institutions have played a critical role in shaping U.S. 
healthcare and its continued adaptation to the changing economic system.  
By highlighting the complex interconnections between capitalism and healthcare 
in the United States, this research suggests that contemporary battles over health care 
reform will not be settled exclusively by political will, or even by moralistic or economic 
arguments. The healthcare system is embedded within and deeply reflects the overall 
economic structure. A restructuring of the healthcare system to one which responds to the 
needs of society and makes use of possible advances in medicine and technology is 
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possible within the context of a broader restructuring of the economic, political, and 
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